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The New Democratic Majority, Part One: Barack Obama Redraws the Electoral Map
Barack Obama's inauguration later this month is the signal moment in a realignment that has taken place in American politics -- a political realignment Obama both helped to forge and rode to a seven-point victory. Yet this realignment is much more than one election of one President. It is a sign of this realignment that the Democratic Party in 2008 won more votes for its Presidential candidate for the fourth time in the last five elections. While most visible at the Presidential level, this realignment is also deeply anchored in party identifications, in state Congressional delegations, in statewide election results, and most deeply, in America's changing issue and demographic landscapes that create long-term structural advantages for Democratic candidates and causes. This piece is the first in an in-depth series that examines the wide-ranging and potentially long-lasting realignment in which Democrats form a new American majority. Because this change is most visible in the recent Presidential election, I start there. The Obama Effect and Realignment The recent Presidential election results show two things: a rising tide that lifted all Democratic boats, and also, the specific effect Obama's candidacy had above and beyond that tide. To understand the latter (Obama's marginal contribution), you need first to measure the former (the baseline of Democratic improvement from 2004 to 2008). While John Kerry lost the Presidential popular vote to George Bush by 2.4%, Barack Obama won the Presidential popular vote by 7.2%, a margin of 52.9%-45.7%. Taking the Democratic ticket's 9.6% improvement from 2004 to 2008 as the baseline, the Obama/Biden ticket beat that improvement handily in a number of states. As I have in prior posts, I will call that the Obama Effect. For example, a state moving from a 2 percentage point Kerry loss to a 12.6 percentage point Obama win (a 14.6 point improvement, 5 percent above the expected improvement of 9.6%) would have an Obama Effect (OE) of +5%, demonstrating that Obama's candidacy was particularly important in that state. Using this Obama Effect shows that Obama's contribution to the Democratic realignment occurred most obviously in three principal swaths: (1) solidifying the upper Midwest; (2) in the West and Great Plains, making the Democratic Party competitive where it wasn't competitive, and ascendant where it was roughly tied; and (3) improving Democratic performance in largely black states of the Eastern seaboard. In the upper Midwest, Obama brought Indiana back into the Democratic column for the first times since 1964, turned Iowa (red in 2004) blue by a decisive margin. The numbers show a positive Obama Effect in five of these six states, and a significant one in four of the six. State 04 Vote R D 08 Vote R D Marginal Change Obama Effect Indiana 59.9 39.3 49.0 49.9 (-20.6 to +0.9) +21.5 OE +11.9 Illinois 44.5 54.8 36.9 61.8 (+10.3 to +24.9) +14.6 OE +5.0 Wisconsin 49.4 49.7 56.3 42.4 (+0.3 to +13.9) +13.6 OE +4.0 Michigan 47.8 51.2 40.9 57.4 (+3.4 to +16.5) +13.1 OE +3.5 Iowa 49.9 49.3 44.7 54.0 (-.6 to +9.3) +9.9 OE +.3 Minnesota 48.0 51.5 44.0 54.2 (+3.5 to +10.2) +6.7 OE -2.9 While Minnesota alone showed a negative Obama Effect, with an improvement of less than 9.6% from 2004 to 2008, it is important to remember that McCain invested far more in Minnesota than did Obama. Obama clearly could have run up the score there if desired; the state is thus even safer blue than his 10.2% margin of victory indicates. Just as importantly, reasonably popular Republican incumbent Senator Norm Coleman was apparently unseated in Minnesota by controversial challenger Al Franken, leaving the GOP with only two Senators among these six states. The large margins among five of these six states are notable. In the southwest, Obama turned blue three increasingly Hispanic states that had voted for Bush in 2004 (Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada) by massive infusions of volunteer time, advertising money, and did so by improving on John Kerry's showings by 13 to 15 percent, racking up large Obama Effects: State 04 Vote R D 08 Vote R D Marginal Change Obama Effect New Mexico 49.8 49.0 42.0 56.7 (-0.8 to +14.7) +15.5 OE +5.9 Nevada 50.7 48.1 42.7 55.1 (-2.6 to +12.4) +15.0 OE +5.4 Colorado 51.7 47.0 44.9 53.5 (-4.7 to +8.6) +13.3 OE +3.7 Meanwhile, in the South and mid-Atlantic, the Obama Effect was pronounced. There, the coalition of energized and nearly unanimous black voters, young voters, white liberals, and white working class voters concerned about the economy turned Virginia blue for the first time since 1964, North Carolina blue for the first time since 1976, put Maryland (blue since 1988) into blowout territory, and brought Georgia from a brutal 16.6 point loss to a more respectable 5.2 point defeat. Here are the data: State 04 Vote R D 08 Vote R D Marginal Change Obama Effect Virginia 53.8 45.6 46.4 52.7 (-8.2 to +6.3) +14.5 OE +4.9 N. Carolina 56.1 43.6 49.5 49.9 (-12.5 to +0.4) +12.9 OE +3.3 Maryland 43.0 56.0 36.8 61.9 (+13.0 to +25.1) +12.1 OE +2.5 Georgia 58.0 41.4 47.0 52.2 (-16.6 to -5.2) +11.4 OE +1.8 The Obama Effect suggests we will be talking about Obama voters much as we did Reagan Democrats or Clinton Democrats (the lured back Reagan folk) for years to come. But so much of the 2008 election was structural and not personal. The Rising Tide: 246-252 EVs, and Four Regional Bulwarks, Lie Beyond Republican Reach While we deservedly focus on the the changes Obama wrought in the electoral map, the base of his win was the rising Democratic tide. Obama won 255 electoral votes (EVs) in states he won by 10 points or more -- and 245 of these electoral votes came from states won by the Democratic candidate in each of the last five elections, New Mexico and Nevada being the two exceptions with 5 EVs each. While these Obama states will lose in the 2010 census a net of 3-9 EV's per Nate Silver's estimate, that still leaves 246-252 electoral votes that are appear securely Democratic in even reasonably competitive elections. Though Democrats lamented in 2004 and 2008 the need to hit a "triple bank shot" among Florida, Ohio, and Michigan to win the White House, the reality is quite the contrary: the Democratic Party starts off very near victory, given the electoral votes reposed in four regional bulwarks, three of which are now strongly inhospitable to Republican Presidential nominees, and one of which is largely inhospitable to them. Most challenging are the 77 EVs of the Pacific Rim, including Washington and Oregon that went for Obama by 17 and 16 respectively, California by 26, and Hawaii by 46. None of these four states has voted Republican since 1984, except for California, which tipped very narrowly for Bush over Dukakis in 1988, when Bush won nationally by eight. All four states now have two Democratic Senators, with the defeat of Gordon Smith in Oregon. Color them blue. Likewise hostile are the 30 EVs of New England other than New Hampshire. Maine, Vermont and Connecticut have gone Democratic (14 EVs between them) from 1992 to the present. Just as staunchly Democratic, Rhode Island and Massachusetts had turned blue in each Presidential tilt from 1988 to the present. No better for the GOP are the 80 midAtlantic EVs distributed from New York through Maryland: New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware have gone Democratic in Presidential elections from 1992 to the present, New York since 1988, and DC since 1964. Merely very inhospitable to the GOP are the 58 EVs of the upper Midwest, based upon periodically close margins in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin, though each delivered for Obama in double digits. Minnesota has voted for Democratic Presidential candidates from 1976 to the present, voting in the last three elections by 2 percent, 6 percent, and 2.5 percent more than the national Democratic totals. Wisconsin has gone blue from 1988 to the present, but went for Gore and Kerry by two-tenths and four-tenths of one percent before Obama's fourteen point win. Michigan has been more securely Democratic, running five points ahead of the national average in favor of Gore and Kerry before delivering a seventeen point win to Obama. Most reliable in this group is Illinois which, like California, almost went for Dukakis, and has been blue ever since, lately by enormous margins. Again, there are 245 EVs won by the Democrats in the last five elections, to which Obama added decisive wins in Nevada and New Mexico, states increasingly Hispanic and in Nevada's case, increasingly settled and canvassed by denizens of the core state of the Democratic majority -- California. This leads us to the GOP's electoral quandary. The GOP's Electoral Dilemma: A Series of Regional Problems Let's assume that the Democratic base described above amounts to 249 EVs. That means a Democrat need capture only 21 more EVs to win the Presidency. The GOP essentially must run the table, a daunting task given the diversity of the states it must defend. Problem No. 1: Democratic Base + Florida = GOP Loss. Florida, won by Clinton twice and Obama once and counting, will have 28 or 29 EVs after the next census, more than enough to tip the balance when added to the Democratic base. The GOP therefore must win it even to have a chance. Problem No. 2: Iowa and New Hampshire Are Really Part of the Democratic Base. Iowa, which will have 6 EVs after 2010, voted decisively for Obama (54.0 to 44.7), and voted for Kerry and Obama by about 1.8% more than the national trend in both cases, giving the state a blue lean, and showing its strong winnability. New Hampshire's 4 EVs have departed from the Democratic fold only once in the last five Presidential election cycles, very narrowly tipping to Bush over Gore in 2000, and went for Obama by 9.5 points, displaying 3 and 2 point blue leans in the past two elections. This puts the Democratic base at 259 EVs, 10 short of the Presidency, assuming continued Democratic control of 26 House delegations. Problem No. 3: The GOP Is Vulnerable To Any Southern Democrat. A Democrat from the South who can hold the above-mentioned base states need only deliver one of five southern states to win the Presidency: Florida (see Problem No. 1), North Carolina (15 EVs), Georgia (15 EVs), Virginia (13 EVs), Tennessee (11 EVs). Likewise, a Democrat from the North who particularly excites African-American voters has a great shot at these states -- as evidenced by the fact that Barack Obama won three of the five. Problem No. 4: The GOP Is Vulnerable To Any Western Democrat. A Democrat from the West who can hold the above-mentioned base states can win the Presidency by winning Arizona (12 EVs after 2010), or Colorado (9 EVs) and one more EV. You get the idea. Ideology aside, this is not a chess game in which you'd like the GOP's pieces and position. A Strong Base, A Redrawn Map: One Face of the New Democratic Majority Barack Obama's redrawing of the electoral map, fighting and winning on the new battlegrounds of Nevada, Colorado, Indiana, Virginia, and North Carolina, overlaid onto the Democratic Party's strong national electoral base, spelled decisive victory, and underscored the Republican electoral quandary. Obama's unique skills, his rhetorical vision of a less partisan, more united America, and his enormous current popularity (73% approval, per Gallup) all carry within them the seeds of a greater and higher electoral ascent. Yet Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, or Bill Richardson likely would have won this -- for Democrats -- almost uniquely winnable election. The election's results nonetheless confirm the Democrats' structural advantage in Presidential elections: an electoral base of states voting blue in unison since 1992 nearly large enough to deliver victory on their own, with many alternate paths to the few additional electoral votes needed. While winning the Presidency is a sign of the health of a national party, the next two posts in this series analyze two equally important facets of the Democratic Party's new eminence: how changing party affiliations coupled with state and local election results, and ultimately the changing demography and issue frames of our time, are part of the rise of the new Democratic majority. Dag? Nab it! Subscribe to the latest from your favorite topic, blogger, or entire site. |
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I recently read that 22 states have joined the national trend to undermine the electoral college by pledging their ev's to the popular majority winner once more than 270 evs (by states) join the movement. This could be in effect before 2012. So does your analysis mean anything?
Leave it to landed gentry, such as a Marquis, to cast aspersions on an institution as empowering of the little guy as the Electoral College.
Marq, I don't think that can possibly work until all states agree to do it. I cannot imagine a compact of some but not all states choosing to vote that way. Additionally, I think it's unconstitutional.
But let's assume that the EC goes the way of the landed gentry, as you suggest. In that case, the analysis is much the same. Except instead of EVs, you would say that the enormous Democratic pluralities drawn from CA, NY, and IL are the bulwark. Same analysis.
*tips tricorner hat to Marquis*
Marqis, the 22 count is inflated. 4 states have enacted national popular vote laws, and such laws have passed both legislative houses in another 4. NPV laws have passed one house in 6 states and legislative committees in another 8. 4 + 4 + 6 + 8 = 22. The NPV website has a map showing the progress.
That said, I take issue with A-man's inability to imagine "a compact of some but not all states choosing to vote that way." Such a compact already exists between Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey, which I believe meet the criteria of "some but not all." If states with a total of 270 EVs join the compact, the members are required by law to commit their EVs to the popular winner.
Moreover, once you pass the 270 EV threshold, the remaining states are irrelevant. The holdouts could vote for whomever they wanted, but the NPV states would vote in unision and determine the winner.
Articleman, which article/amendment of the constitution do you think that the NPV pledge violates?
The Electoral College does not presuppose a manner of selection other than a state choosing who it prefers for President, not delegating that choice to other states that have chosen in a manner precisely opposite to its voters. You're creating a procedural device between the voters and the EC. I think you can't do that.
I disagree with this assessment Articleman. Each state is free to assign its electoral votes as it chooses. If it chooses to allocate them to the winner of the national popular vote, that would seem perfectly legitimate. And, I might add, a gosh darn good idea.
Nice post, Aman. I agree with your analysis of the trend, but I'm not confident that the trend will continue. Until a few years ago, there was a robust Republican trend that has only recently been reversed.
BTW, your post got picked up in some automated google newsfeed, which I mention only because the mysterious powers of the internet decided to associate it with Paul Krugman's picture. Is there something you're not telling us? Click here, and scroll down to see it.
Krugman used the phrase "new Democratic majority" that I'm so fond of in one of his recent masterworks. I regard Krugman as Obama's personal concern troll.
The GOP was in ascent from 1994 to 2006. These things are brief if you make them so. The Iraq War was the furthest extension of, and spent the political and intellectual vitality of, the conservative movement that triumphed in 1994 and ended two or so years ago.
I'll discuss the demographic aspect in part three.
It's not just ethnic demogrphics that favor the Dems, but also increasing class disparity. In fact, the one question/issue I have with Articleman's thesis is how much of the 'Obama effect' will prove to be the 'Bush effect' or the 'Economy effect' (especially in an 'inhospitable' region like the Upper Midwest, I can imagine that the Democratcs' more populist policies accounted for much of that shift).
I dont expect this to happen anytime soon, but if the economy strengthens again or the Republican platform bends more populist, those gains could evaporate quite quickly. I venture that this country socially still leans conservative, so when the economy is less of an issue, the allegiance of those working class areas could switch.
I do believe the gains produced by ethnic demo shifts are more sustainable.
I'll talk about some of those other changes soon, but the GOP hasn't won Pennsylvania since 1988, Rhode Island since 1984, or Minnesota or Wisconsin in many moons. If the economy strengthens on Obama's watch, I don't see how that doesn't add to public confidence in his administration.
I think that Deadman's point is valid--Republicans are generally social populists, whereas Democrats are generally economic populists. The relative strength of the economy for the past 15 years enabled Republicans to gain by focusing on social issues.
You raise a second economic effect, which is that a strong economy favors incumbents while a weak economy favors challegers.
This year, Republicans received a double whammy--an emphasis on economic over social issues and a poor economy that was blamed on Republican leadership.
Articleman, you're correct that the second effect will sustain the Democratic majority if the economy improves. But if we have another long period of economic stability, the second effect will weaken, and the first effect will bend voters to the Republican side. That's what happened in 2000, when Democrats lost despite the booming economy.
It's a function of several things. In 2000, the Democratic Party had not recently won a group of states comprising nearly half the electoral college by ten or more points. Michigan by 17? Wisconsin by 14? Nevada by 13?
The demographic changes, and the fact that the Republican Party is anchored in states and positions appealing to states that are on one side of American politics are problems the GOP will need to solve before it wins its next national election. I'm going to discuss those in my third post in this series.
And further back at Deadman's Curve, the Obama Effect is Obama's marginal contribution above the trend, so I think that piece is not a Bush effect, unless one posits that Indiana, Montana, Nevada, Virginia, and Georgia are especially unhappy with Bush 43. My use of the phrase Obama Effect does not ascribe the Democratic triumph to him personally, though I think Obama personally is one of the principal causes of the 9.6% improvement from 2004 to 2008.
Put another way, I think backed up four years, Obama 2008 beats Bush 2004 in a hypothetical battle of the campaigns.
This issue I take with you is not the Obama Effect, a plausible concept that I credit to you, but what you cite as "Democrats' structural advantage." If you lower the average voter affiliation a few points across the board, which has happened before and could easily happen again, you get the Gore-Kerry scenario, where Democrats have a fairly reliable 250 odd EVs, if you include PA and MI, and substantial difficulty pulling in any other states. Perhaps Obama '08 could have defeated Bush '04, but Obama is the strongest candidate Dems have run since Clinton, and frankly, G.W. was never especially strong. He's certainly no Reagan. But with Dems running non-Obamas in '00 and '04, it was Republicans who had the "structural advantage" until at least '06, as evidenced by their legislative dominance.
So I don't disagree with your analysis of '08, but I'm skeptical about whether it will be applicable to '16 or even to '12 if Obama were not the nominee.
Hey man, let me get all three parts up!
Seriously, G. (and weren't you going to be renamed? or was that like when I took requests?), I think if you take the base I describe, the Democrats have more opportunities to grab formerly red states (IA, NH, VA, CO) than the GOP does to reach into that base. But again, part three, the demographic piece of the puzzle, adds to this, and even more, the issue frame we're in.
Obama is one of the best Dem candidates in a century. Wait and see how he does in 2012 before you dismiss the idea of structural advantage. If he pulls 57 or more, I think you'll see it differently. And twelve years is a long time for a pendulum swing. FDR and Truman held sway for twenty, but that took the confluence of the worst domestic and foreign crises in American history.
I'm not saying it can't happen, just that it's too soon too predict that it will. Remember Rove's permanent Republican majority? That was '04. But I'll wait for your future posts.
I abandoned the name search when we got more bloggers without "man" suffixes. How about Genghimus? Gengho?
Well said, O. I agree, and thus think the challenge is good and clean governance. If that delivers, I don't see the Democrats losing the House or the Senate (part two of my series). These things work in synergy (except for 1993, and I don't want to get our resident Clinton buff mad, so I won't mention that just yet).
Regardless of the actual outcome, Bush-Gore was a statistical tie, with or without Nader. By effect #2, it should not have been. An incumbent VP losing (or barely winning) in a booming economy? Very unusual. And it wasn't just the presidential race. Congressional Republicans made gains that year, as they did almost every election between '92 and '06.
There are many factors behind the diminished influence of social conservatism in '08, but you cannot dismiss the state of the economy as a big one, the biggest IMO. Today's scandal-embroiled Republicans will be all but forgotten four years from now, and we're more likely to read about powerdrunk Democrats in the news. Social wedge issues may change and evolve, but social populism has always played a major role in American politics. Liberals who discount its power because of a couple of elections during which it has receded do so out their peril.
2000 was the impeachment, and the partisan fatigue. 2008 was partisan fatigue squared. Disagree with your assessment of what happened in Congress. But again, I'll be getting to that.