dagblog - Comments for "What Pakistan Knows"

Actually, I never said that

Doctor Cleveland — Sun, 22 May 2011 22:28:36 +0000

In reply to All Pasha and Kayani need is

Actually, I never said that Pasha and Kayani were boy scouts, or that accounting is the only problem. It's certainly not a few bad apples.

My intent is to point out how difficult it is to bring either the Army or the ISI to heel. You can't simply replace Pasha or Kayani. They would only be replaced by similar people with exactly the same problems. And there's no solving it by getting rid of a few insubordinates. The whole system is insubordinate. It's not as easy as replacing the chiefs, or having the chiefs instill priper discipline. Instilling proper discipline, whoever the chief is, is likely impossible.

It's not quite OT, Doc, but

we are stardust — Sat, 21 May 2011 03:45:17 +0000

In reply to What Pakistan Knows

It's not quite OT, Doc, but you may be interested in this news item about China giving fighter jets to Pakistan; a bit of a game-changer over 'bad blood'.

All Pasha and Kayani need is

NCD — Fri, 20 May 2011 22:38:58 +0000

In reply to Or to flip it around, the

All Pasha and Kayani need is 'plausible deniability' relating to any or all terror related persons, attacks, assassinations or incidents. Whether it be the massacre of aid workers form India in Kabul, the Mumbai attack, cross border Taliban terrorists residing in Pak, or the OBL mansion in Abbottabad, the top men will always claim non-involvement.

I find it amusing that both you and Genghis seem to believe that Pasha and Kayani are squeaky clean fellows who just have a few bad apples operating under them, and that better accounting might have prevented the above incidents.

Or to flip it around, the

Doctor Cleveland — Fri, 20 May 2011 18:06:00 +0000

In reply to The question is what extent

Or to flip it around, the question is how much control Pasha and Kayani have over their subordinates themselves. Pasha and Kayani are beholding to other power brokers inside (and outside) the organizations they head. The question isn't always whether they want to discipline a subordinate; sometimes the question is whether they can afford to discipline that subordinate, and how much.

Pasha and Kayani are politicians, too. Their constituency is the other power players in their agencies, whose backing or consent they need to hold on to their positions, let alone to get anything done. (Every general is chosen through a political process; in our system, the final say goes to politicians outside the military. In military dictatorships, the internal military politics is the main game.) If some of the people going behind their backs are protected by big fish, or are the big fish themselves, Pasha and Kayani are going to have to compromise. Remember, we're talking about a political culture that revolves around favors and connections, and one where graft . So maybe you can't fire or punish this or that subordinate without getting his Uncle Hamid's okay.

And, most importantly, there's not a lot of budget accountability, so it must be very easy to fund black ops without your bosses knowing. It's already a country where it's assumed that nobody's looking at the budget figures too hard, because everyone accepts that some of the budget goes in your own pockets. Combine that with the secrecy and compartmentalization of an intelligence budget, and it's pretty easy to fund the Mumbai attacks or a safe house in Abbottabad. Put it this way: lots of Army and ISI types have built themselves nice houses in Abbottabad using money officially budgeted for something else. It would be pretty easy to build one for OBL.

The question is what extent

Michael Wolraich — Fri, 20 May 2011 17:16:04 +0000

In reply to I don't know. I don't know

The question is what extent that insubordination is tolerated. Do Pasha and Kayani have a don't-ask-don't-tell policy with regard to their subordinates' activities? That would imply at least tacit permission to engage in operations like sheltering Bin Laden.

Or do they literally have no control over their subordinates. We're not talking about minor abuses of power here. Bin Laden is not some agent's corrupt brother-in-law. If someone within ISI was hiding him in contradiction to the orders from the chief, that's a big deal. As was the killing of Bhutto.

The ISI is very decentralized

acanuck — Fri, 20 May 2011 17:05:54 +0000

In reply to I don't know. I don't know

The ISI is very decentralized and compartmentalized, and I suspect the high command prefers it that way. Plausible deniability when things go wrong or get exposed -- the OBL raid, the Mumbai massacre, aid to the Taliban. I haven't a clue how much Kayani and Pasha really know. But as you say, doctor, certainly far more than Zardari does.

I don't know. I don't know

Doctor Cleveland — Fri, 20 May 2011 16:55:00 +0000

In reply to Doc, I think that you've got

I don't know. I don't know who knows what.

But I don't believe that the Pakistan security appartus works like the American security apparatus does. I am not confident that there is full disclosure up the chain of command. (Would Kayani and Pasha have hidden bin Laden there?)

I think we may be talking about a certain degree of institutionalized insubordination, where things don't get reported to direct superiors, and where some elements of the security forces do end runs around their supervisors and count on other powerful allies to cover for them.

Doc, I think that you've got

Michael Wolraich — Fri, 20 May 2011 16:33:12 +0000

In reply to What Pakistan Knows

Doc, I think that you've got the wrong guy. Sure, Zardari doesn't have much control of the military, but the U.S. doesn't necessarily deal directly with him on military matters anyway.

But what about General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief? He used to be the director of the ISI. What about Lieutenant-General Ahmad Pasha, the current director of the ISI? Are they similarly clueless about what their subordinates are up to?

Pakistan is running low on

Donal — Fri, 20 May 2011 14:48:29 +0000

In reply to What Pakistan Knows

Pakistan is running low on energy and water, and oil-generated electricity is often turned off for 18 - 20 hours per day. Their once promising textile export business suffers from the outages, and farming of course suffers from water shortages.

Saudi Arabia has been forgiving Pakistan's oil import bill for several years now, so I expect that the KSA has a fair amount of influence in Pakistani affairs as well.

An excellent question, DC.,

Peter Schwartz — Fri, 20 May 2011 11:39:04 +0000

In reply to What Pakistan Knows

An excellent question, DC., and right on point, I think.