dagblog - Comments for "Iranian American Jews Decline to Meet Rouhani"

F.Y.I., Lulu: As Relations

artappraiser — Sun, 24 Nov 2013 20:30:20 +0000

In reply to Surely there was a chair for

F.Y.I., Lulu:

As Relations Warmed, Secret Talks Paved Way for Iran Deal
ABC News, Nov. 24, 2013

[.....] Burns, Sullivan and a team of technological experts discussed Iran's nuclear program with senior Iranian officials at meetings in Oman and Geneva. They also met in New York City during the United Nations General Assembly, which convened in September and October.

Those secret talks unfolded as relations warmed publicly for the first time in decades.

In late September, as the U.N. General Assembly convened in New York, Secretary of State John Kerry met, one on one, with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif -- even as experts warned that contact between Iran and the U.S. would prove politically difficult for both sides at home [....]

Turns out the State Dept.

artappraiser — Sat, 28 Sep 2013 17:22:47 +0000

In reply to I pointed out what appeared

Turns out the State Dept. extended a strong gesture of intent to break the diplomatic freeze:

http://dagblog.com/link/zarif-diary-us-iran-breakthrough-17539#comment-1...

This is a more meaningful action than an in-the-room presence at the first (of two) speeches by Rouhani on neutral U.N. territory. It was an actual government-to-government interaction. It also suggests an openness to end the freezing of assets.

Now that Rouhani's trip is over, I see no intentional dissing by the U.S. at all. Zero, zip. And some evidence to the contrary. Including an lot of effort not to derail by pushing interaction, like a handshake at a luncheon, but being open to whatever Rouhani was comfortable with, like a phone call....And that's without mentioning that all parties concerned were working on the Syria resolution at the very same time, that Lavrov also couldn't make the speech in person.

Oh this book too long, too

Michael Wolraich — Fri, 27 Sep 2013 20:57:05 +0000

In reply to What you are talking about

Oh this book too long, too long. But the full manuscript is almost done. One week more. And then the revisions, but I hope that those are less intense.

I agree with almost everything you write here with a couple of caveats. What distinguishes Israel is not that if fears Iranian nuclear ambitions--many nations fear them, particularly Sunni Arab nations--but that 1) the peril is much greater for Israel, and 2) the Israelis are much more (openly) suspicious of Rouhani.

As for Israel and the Iranian hardliners, I'm not talking about good-cop, though that is a factor. I'm talking about perceptions. Think of the old salesman's trick. If you convince a potential buyer that a property is in demand, the buyer will frequently value it higher. This is the same principle in reverse. At a simplistic level, you could call it reverse psychology. The more Israel hates the deal, the more likely the Iranians, including the hardliners, will like it.

What you are talking about

Bruce Levine — Fri, 27 Sep 2013 13:26:23 +0000

In reply to Not good, not good at all I

What you are talking about suggests that you would be a good partner at negotiations, which often involves more than the two parties sitting across the table from each other, and it's a good point. Of course it ultimately depends on the authority each side brings to the table, and at this point President Rouhani has represented to the world -- and President Obama and Secretary Kerry are accepting that premise, or so it seems -- that he has the authority to fully negotiate an agreement that will ensure the international community that Iran's enrichment program going forward will be for peaceful purposes.

At the same time, as you suggest and as I think we've been discussing on the various threads, there are factions behind the scenes that influence what happens at the table. You posit that Israeli hardline rhetoric out of the mouths of the Bibis of the Israeli political realm will cause the Iranian hardliners to give President Rouhani more authority to negotiate--at least I think that's what you're saying. I'm not sure I understand that dynamic but you could be correct.

Here's the way I see things in terms of where the relevant parties are, and I'll leave out every other country besides Israel, the United States, and Iran--like most of the international community and certainly the mainstream and not-so-mainstream media, the meme seems to be that Israel is the only country that fears a nuclear Iran and for whatever reason the United States is concerned about that as well--some folks will buy the MJ approach, and others will look at the oil in the Middle East, and others will look at whatever.

So let's take Iran first and at the threshold and President Rouhani, as you point out, really is walking a tight rope. To simplify things, and I think this is overly simple, let's concentrate Iranian "hardliners" into one bucket consisting of Khameni and his theocratic authoritarian base and the Revolutionary Guard. I guess you're saying that they are more likely to move closer to favoring negotiations with the U.S. because of Israeli hard-line rhetoric. Possibly, but I don't understand that. My sense is that if things aren't going well at the table, the hardliners would be ready to pounce on the meme that the U.S. is without authority given the hardline rhetoric of Bibi and his ilk.

Then there are the majority of Iranians who voted for President Rouhani. It is those folks, I think, who would be more inclined to push even harder for a negotiated settlement if there is a presumption that Israeli hardline rhetoric will influence the United States at the table. Most Iranians, I think, are anxious for sanctions to be lifted and that was the centerpiece and the essence of Presdent Rouhani's electoral victory.

Now Israel. First, I would say that 99 percent of Israelis, except perhaps the domestic fans of of the Gideon Levy set, are genuinely concerned about Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb that would literally destroy the Jewish State. Mutually Assured Destruction doesn't do much for the Jewish State. Bibi Netanyahu milks that for domestic political purposes--no doubt, and no doubt, rightly or wrongly, there is less trust between the American and Israeli Administrations than there was under both Presidents Clinton and Bush II. The relationship is far more analogous to the frosty relationship that Israeli Prime Minister Shamir had with Bush I. Most folks don't know that we have used the stick against the Israelis, and we did threaten to and did withhold aid from Israel back then. MJ won't tell you that--I just did. :)

So Netanyahu milks this existential fear and is also concerned like the rest of the country about a nuclear Iran, and of course about continued Iranian support for Hizbollah to Israel's north. But, as I've written elsewhere, he's getting pushback from inside his Cabinet for his hardline stance, and that reflects I think the feeling among most Israelis that they don't want to pick a fight with Iran. So that leaves Bibi stoking domestic flames as a problem, but really incidental. I say that because nobody, not even the pundits, except for the MJs of the world who like to perpetuate the notion that it's all about a zionist thirst for war, have ever explained to me why it is in any way in Israel's national interest to pick a fight with Iran. At some point things just have to make sense, and that position makes none IMO.

As to the U.S., I'm going to assume that the United States, even without a Jewish State with an obnoxious prime minister, has a genuine interest in making sure that Iran does not pursue the capacity to build a nuclear bomb. I will also assume that for domestic political reasons alone (just assuming this), the United States feels it necessary to ensure Israel that diplomacy needs to be given a chance, and I will repeat my assumption that Israel really does fear a nuclear Iran. Here's what's going on I think. There's a little bargaining going on right now involving another front. Some of us might have noticed that Secretary Kerry has determined that he is going to take a much more active and direct role in the negotiations between Abbas and Netanyahu in connection with that evasive two-state solution. That settlement is in the interest of every moderate in the Middle East, but particularly for every Sunni state in the region and especially for moderate Palestinians. And it is clearly in the interest of Israel--notwithstanding Netanyahu and the obstructionists to his right. I see the US promising Israel tough negotiations with Iran that includes a club on the table (leverage is part and parcel of negotiations and it is what elected Rouhani in the first place).

So the quid pro quo is, and this is simple, we will protect you Israel in our negotiations with Iran and will do whatever -- and that means whatever -- we must to prevent a nuclear Iran. But we want to see more cooperation at the bargaining table with the Palestinians too. Will that work? G-d willing. As I say to my clients on the eve of a strike vote, sometimes you just can't get a deal, until you get one.

Circling back to Netanyahu's bullshit, I don't think it hurts the American position--as you seem to be saying, but I think for a different reason, namely that it goes back to the ole' but effective good cop bad cop routine.

On the other hand, what is really going on could have nothing at all to do with what I've just spent 20 minutes writing. But fwiw, my nickel.

Hope the book is going well. Remember, sometimes things will never get done, until they're finished.

Cheers.

Not good, not good at all I

Michael Wolraich — Fri, 27 Sep 2013 01:49:14 +0000

In reply to Not good, not good at

Not good, not good at all

I beg to differ. Furious Israeli opposition plays right into Rouhani's hands. The furiouser the better.

He's playing a delicate balancing act. The Iranian hardliners are waiting to pounce. If Khamenei gives they signal, they will savage him as an Israeli patsy. So the louder the Israelis bawl about wolves in sheeps' clothing, the better Rouhani looks back home and the more room he has to negotiate.

In fact, if I were the conspiracy type, I might speculate that Rouhani and Netanyahu had something going behind the scenes. I'm not actually, and I don't think it's deliberate. But I do think Israeli opposition is good for American-Iranian relations.

Lulu, I didn't mean to offend

Bruce Levine — Thu, 26 Sep 2013 19:56:45 +0000

In reply to Right, glad you can laugh,

Lulu,

I didn't mean to offend you, please. I was laughing because I was referring to bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, and then you asked me about Israel. And it was laughing in a good faith kind of way, given our recent past. Please, I did not mean to offend you at all.

Of course, I believe that Israel is a very important player in terms of its position on Iran, yes, because ultimately if an agreement is not reached to its satisfaction it could ultimately choose to determine to take matters into its own hands. I hardly meant to suggest the contrary.

Right, glad you can laugh,

A Guy Called LULU — Thu, 26 Sep 2013 19:28:07 +0000

In reply to I wasn't talking about Israel

Right, glad you can laugh, laughter is good for your blood pressure, but I include Israel as an interested and powerfully influential party in any negotiations about Iran's nuclear future even if those talks were to be formally between only the U.S. and Iran. You probably noticed that Obama did too. And, your comment is within a sub-thread specifically about what significance, what meaning if any, there is to whether powerful and interested parties sent a representative to Roumani's speech. IMO, the U.S. sending Powers would have not said anything of significance but keeping her away says something of at least slight significance. Using Israel as an example to make that case is relevant because of their close involvement in the whole issue but in Israel's case the opposite is true. Not sending a rep made a small, relatively unimportant at this point in time, non-supportive statement while sending one would have made a much bigger statement that I would have seen as adding to my hope for a good final outcome.

You don't expect the bigger, broader, discussion both at national leadership level and at the level of public discourse, to go on without mention and analysis of Israel's involvement do you?

I wasn't talking about Israel

Bruce Levine — Thu, 26 Sep 2013 18:33:14 +0000

In reply to The important point is the

I wasn't talking about Israel Lulu!!! I was talking about our country and Iran!!! LOL

The important point is the

A Guy Called LULU — Thu, 26 Sep 2013 17:36:24 +0000

In reply to Lulu, I think the important

The important point is the importance of those negotiations being successful. No Israeli representative at the speech was taking a position or making a statement, and not a supportive one. No?

I pointed out what appeared

A Guy Called LULU — Thu, 26 Sep 2013 17:30:02 +0000

In reply to It just sounds to me like you

I pointed out what appeared to be a molehill, not a mountain, but you insist that even seeing a small bump means a defective, selective, vision which misses the real picture which you see clearly. OK, maybe so.
We all know the prelude. Threats of war, pushes for war, fear of war, crippling economic sanctions which are hurting Iran a lot and even if they have not yet caused the death of five-hundred thousand Iranian children they can be assumed to strengthen the position of nut-case hard liners which certainly exist in Iran as they do in every other country involved. Now Rouhani comes to the U.N. to make a speech of major importance. If Rouhanl's overture fails to ultimately bring an agreement then I don't think we can expect the situation to revert to where it has been for some years. It will bring the parties directly involved to a place where a military confrontation is even more likely than before. I consider the avoidance of that outcome to be a very big deal.
I assume that every aspect of the U.S. actions and response to this diplomatic mission was carefully thought out with some strategy in mind. I want to believe that Obama will work hard and courageously to secure a long term peace between Iran and its adversaries. In working out the U.S. strategy it was decided, and almost certainly not by Powers and of her own volition, whether or not she would attend. I would bet my ass and all its fixtures, and you can/should do so too, that if Obama or Kerry had said to Powers to go to the speech and listen respectfully, that she would have done so and that other meeting would not have stood in the way. So, I would also bet that she was instructed to stay away. Wouldn't you?

You assert that what was decided means nothing at all. I have certainly never said nor have I hinted that I believe in Obama's ability to play winning multi dimensional chess on the world's checker board, but what all sides are doing is often expressed as playing a game, and that analogy assumes an intention to win and so each overt, deliberate move is seen as somehow intending to help make a score. What I am saying, and what I said in opening this subject, is that the decision for neither the Secretary of State nor his underling, the Ambassador of the United States of America to the United Nations, to be present at this very important speech at the United Nations meant something. I specifically said that it was not an overt diss like showing up just to walk out would be, but it also was not an overtly respectful reception. If the U.S. had announced a major presentation at the U.N. by President Obama to tell the world that it was going to try hard to change our relationship with Iran for the better and to look for new and productive ways to interact with each other and then Iran did not even send a high level rep to listen to his speech it would mean something, don't you think? It might even be seen as something significant enough to be noted immediately by the media. In that hypothetical case they might have even seen a decision not to attend as an overt diss.
You may believe as you stated that even though U.S. leaders and operatives watched and listened with bated breath to every word out of Rouhani's mouth, and presumably continue analyze every word and every nuance, that despite all that, our Ambassador not being there in person meant nothing. OK, I get it, I know your position, I simply disagree.

Is your conclusion that my disagreement on this [hopefully] small thing means I am just looking blindly for any opportunity to diss the U.S.' handling of the presentation any more substantive and to the point than if I choose to support my disagreement with you by saying that you are just blindly defending anything the U.S. delegation said or did? Is that what you are doing?