dagblog - Comments for "How to Lose a Counterinsurgency: Part I"

Thanks for the comment,

Doctor Cleveland — Fri, 20 Aug 2010 01:38:24 +0000

In reply to Re Dr. Cleveland's comment

Thanks for the comment, Miguel.

But I did not say that the insurgency did not kill random passersby. I said, very clearly, that the COUNTER insurgency did not kill random passersby. My point is not that the Moros did not kill civilians. My point is that the American occupiers did not.

And the occupiers, who were not killing the populace at random, beat the insurgents who were. I'd say that goes to my point.

Re Dr. Cleveland's comment

Miguel — Thu, 19 Aug 2010 18:14:22 +0000

In reply to True enough, G. Of course,

Re Dr. Cleveland's comment that the insurgency in the Philippines "didn't kill random passersby in Manila," I do recall that the Muslim " Moros" in Mindanao, Jolo and other island far to the south of Manila did engage in the practice of mass killings of innocent civilians. We get the term "running amok" from their pactice of charging into a crowd and of non muslim filipinos and slashing furiously away at them with the "kriss" or "braong" Ritualistically prior to the act they would bathe, cleanse their fingernails and put on a clean white robe in preparation for their entrance into heaven where they would enjoy the company of a number of virgins. Supossedly they wrapped their testicles in leather strapping the would be then soaked in water to shrink around their privates causing pain that would drive then crazy and inure them to any blows that they migght encounter. Apparently ordinary bulluts could not stop a cahrging Moro and the U.S Army brought the .45 caliber pistol to the Philippines specificall as a means of stopping these individuals

True enough, G. Of course,

Doctor Cleveland — Sun, 04 Jul 2010 23:46:40 +0000

In reply to Great article and an

True enough, G. Of course, you can't expose your troops to too much danger.

The insurgents' strategy is, of course, to kill as many occupying troops as they can. So the strategic goals, like the available means, are asymmetrical. The insurgents want to kill enough counterinsurgents to make them give up before the counterinsurgents can win over the populace and achieve political stability. The counterinsurgents want to win over the populace and achieve political stability before before the cost of occupation (especially the human cost) becomes unbearable.

This requires more posts, and I'm planning a minimum of two more. The key points are that the countersurgency needs to build momentum early in the game and needs a viable political partner on the ground who can effectively govern if the situation is stabilized.

The most successful American counterinsurgency is probably the Philippines, which was absolutely brutal but which, to the best of my recall, didn't kill random passersby in Manila.

The goal is to make the general public feel that they're safer and better off with the occupiers' side, rather than the insurgency. if you're killing civilians, you will never gain enough support to win, and the insurgency will keep gathering strength against you.

Great article and an

Michael Wolraich — Sun, 04 Jul 2010 15:42:00 +0000

In reply to How to Lose a Counterinsurgency: Part I

Great article and an excellent analogy. But I wonder if you're leaving out a piece. You insightfully address the strategic consequences of civilian casualties on the overall conflict, but you don't mention the strategic consequences of military casualties. In addition to the sentiments of the occupied population, the occupiers must also contend with the sentiments of their own people, and military losses can quickly sour popular support of a foreign initiative. Consider, for instance, how Black Hawk Down affected the U.S.'s presence in Somalia and its pre-9/11 foreign policy in general.

And in additition to civilian support, you have to deal with militarly morale. Casualties affect morale of course, but so does the belief that the military leadership is putting soldiers lives at unnecessary risk.

These considerations don't take away from your point about the strategic cost of civilian casualties and I don't disagree with your thesis, but they do suggest that to defeat an insurgency, you've got to strike some sort of balance, and finding the right balance is very difficult, perhaps even impossible.

We often hear about successful insurgencies, from the American Revolution to the various rebellions in Afghanistan, but no one speaks much about successful counterinsurgencies. (Tamil Tigers? Shining Path? Chechnyan nationalists?) Too often, I fear, such suppressions work simply because they are brutal and relentless. What successful model of counterinsurgeny is the U.S. following? Iraq?