dagblog - Comments for "How to Lose a Counterinsurgency: Part II"

And we want this

acanuck — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 18:08:18 +0000

In reply to Thanks, AC! I think I do know

And we want this narco-kleptocracy why, exactly? Because it's our narco-kleptocracy? The Karzai government can't even acquit its one valid raison d'etre -- denying Al-Qa'ida a safe base of operation. I know that, in theory, they are all across the border in Pakistan, but to Pashtuns that is a meaningless line in the rock anyway. Meanwhile, by drone-killing people on both sides of that border (many of them innocent civilians), the U.S. is helping the Taliban radicalize and recruit. Destabilizing Pakistan in the process.

As you say, your hopeful scenario isn't what's happening now. But with western troop levels at their peak, it's now or never. In their minds, the Canadians and Brits are already packing up to leave, and Obama has set his own target to begin a withdrawal. Karzai has had two full presidential terms to gain popular support and extend central control -- or even to assemble a military he can rely on. There's no time left.

Petraeus isn't a magician. The "nation-building" strategy is failing in part because we installed the wrong guy, but mostly because anyone we installed was more or less bound to fail. "Graveyard of empires" and all that. As you say, insurgencies do sometimes lose. Afghan insurgencies, however, are on a long winning streak.

Thanks, AC! I think I do know

Doctor Cleveland — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 13:45:56 +0000

In reply to Excellent; even more

Thanks, AC!

I think I do know what "winning" would look like. The central government would get more and more support as time went on, and keep extending and improving its control over the countryside. The Taliban would have more and more trouble finding recruits and non-combatant support (supplies, donations, cooperation) from the locals. As they lost political support, their fighting capacities would get weaker and weaker, and they would not be able to recover from military setbacks. Insurgencies do lose, and when they lose that's what it looks like.

But that doesn't describe what's happening at all.

Excellent; even more

acanuck — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 03:06:00 +0000

In reply to How to Lose a Counterinsurgency: Part II

Excellent; even more excellent than Part I.

Your last sentence sums it up: what do you do when "winning" -- whatever the hell that means in Afghanistan -- is not an option?