dagblog - Comments for "Restoring Integrity to Electronic Voting Systems"

Optical scan is prevalent

DF — Thu, 19 Mar 2009 02:28:04 +0000

Optical scan is prevalent around here. I'm fine with that, too. I don't think electronic systems are necessary, but I wouldn't throw them out entirely because they do provide accessibility features that paper doesn't.

Yeah, they don't need to take

DF — Thu, 19 Mar 2009 02:26:44 +0000

In reply to I agree with the importance

Yeah, they don't need to take the receipt. The voter checks it, but it is retained by the election staff just like a paper ballot. There are already systems that have implemented a "window" approach as you suggest.

I've voted using a system

acanuck — Wed, 18 Mar 2009 22:05:43 +0000

In reply to I agree with the importance

I've voted using a system where you go into a booth, mark up your ballot, and then -- in front of poll observers -- run it through a scanner that records how you voted. It's face down, so secrecy is preserved. The poll officials then retain your original ballot. In effect, it's paper voting, with electronic counting. In the event of a glitch or discrepancy -- say, the total electronic vote doesn't match the total of paper ballots -- the latter can be recounted. Seems to work.

Vote-buying is another kettle of fish entirely. Let's make sure that every vote cast gets counted first.

I agree with the importance

Michael Wolraich — Wed, 18 Mar 2009 21:29:02 +0000

In reply to Restoring Integrity to Electronic Voting Systems

I agree with the importance of a paper trail, but any solution would have to address vote-buying. It would be nice to think that such practices are archaic, but it's not a far cry from street money, which is still used in places like Philadelphia. Vote-buying could particularly effect local elections where several hundred votes can make a difference.

Some M.I.T. profs have proposed an allegedly "ingenious" solution whereby voters receive someone else's random ballot which they can check online. But I don't see how this is any better than an internal paper record that the voter never sees. In either case, the software could be hacked to print incorrect receipts.

You could force voters to deposit their receipts on the way out, but you could't permit election workers to verify the receipts without violating voter privacy, which means that voters could deposit fake receipts. Perhaps you could print out a sealable receipt. They could still in principle be counterfeited, but in that case, the counterfeits could be discovered and the votes rejected.

Another solution would be to print a receipt that the user could see, perhaps through a transparent cover, but not take.