I'd like to second Josh's recommendation to read Spencer Ackerman's article at TAP, "The Obama Doctrine".   I'll toss out a few random observations in case this post stays up long enough for someone to see it and want to respond to any of these points:

It should be clear that Obama is more hawkish on al qaeda than Bush.  Or, perhaps it might be appropriate to say that, unlike Bush, his strategy of destroying al qaeda stands a much better chance of success, and with the additional crucial advantage of not making it more difficult for us to attain other important foreign policy objectives.  Some of the many and growing number of military folks who really do "get" that when it comes to counter-insurgency, success requires the broadest and deepest possible political support from civilians, and who have a developed, practical sense of what that entails for operational details of how one engages in such a struggle, are going to have to be featured prominently in the campaign in order to bolster not only the credibility, but the utimate practical superiority, of Obama's versus McCain's approach on destroying al Qaeda.

At an abstract conceptual level, Ackermans' characterization of the Obama Doctrine strikes me simply, and common-sensically, as liberal internationalism done right.  On the old tpmcafe in 2004-2006, many discussions addressed this topic. Among those who believe doctrine is relevant and potentially useful (many evidently do not) in the conduct of foreign policy, some took liberal internationalism of the sort Ikenberry was proposing as entailing that we should have gone to war with Iraq had we to do everything over again post 9-11.  That was not the case as Ikenberry was opposed to the Iraq war.  Another person who considers herself a liberal internationalist, Anne-Marie Slaughter, evidently was in favor of it even in retrospect (although she would have done it far differently and was adamantly and passionately against the disastrous Abu Ghraib policies), as were many Democratic party foreign policy establishment folks who likewise consider themselves liberal internationalists.  The unsurprising point is that "liberal internationalism" has more than one version and means quite different things to different people.

I do not believe the American people are going to consent to, let alone support, a foreign policy which devotes large new resources to promoting the security and dignity of non-Americans when the safety net in our own society is as tattered as it is and where insecurity is increasingly widespread and devastating to American families.  See Jacob Hacker's The Great Risk Shift for detailed analysis.  Jared Bernstein's All Together Now makes the conceptual point by contrasting a "we're all in this together" versus a "you're on your own" domestic economic and social philosophy.   I believe the call of Robert Kuttner and a growing chorus of others for a new New Deal, responsive to the economic and social realities of today, has to be an essential part of any progressive/liberal revival.  But I also believe it is essential if there is going to be sustainable political support for substantial new resources for a foreign policy centered on dignity-promotion as part of a much more enlightened counter-terrorism approach (as in, one that might serve to help rather than harm our country).  And this is far beyond what I have heard Obama say so far, although Kuttner finds grounds for hope in Obama's recent Cooper Union speech on the financial crisis.  One of the former tpmcafe America Abroad contributors, Ernest Wilson, tried to generate discussion about what he saw as the crucial connections between American foreign and domestic policies.  This may have been part of what he had in mind.

Taking the dignity-promotion agenda on its own terms, I don't get a sense from Ackerman's article on crucial conceptual details in the Obama team's approach to what is after all a hugely ambitious, sweeping agenda.  What would they propose to do differently?  Among these issues, about which I would like to hear more from Ackerman or others, are:

1. Does the Obama team lean towards major reform of existing US and international policies and institutions which address various components of the dignity-enhancement agenda?  (various types of foreign aid, trade policies, international health policies, security assistance of various sorts, etc.)  After all, it isn't as though there have been no efforts heretofore to address these various issues, either by the US or parts of the international community.  What major lessons does the Obama team draw from those experiences?

2. If we take security and basic nutrition and health as basic points of departure, who within an affected nation or region gets to define the sequence and priorities of other components of a "dignity-enhancement" approach?  (Civil/political rights?  Economic development?  Democracy?  Defined how?)

3. I sure hope they think in terms of country or area-specific policies.  This may involve drawing some new strategic maps for policy planning purposes, ones which in some cases will not strictly follow national borders as they now exist.  Are there particular countries or regions which they believe deserve strategic priority for resources?

4. What might an example of a country-specific dignity-promotion strategy look like?  How would it differ from approaches that have been used in the past?

Finally, good for Sarah Sewall for rolling up her sleeves and getting her hands dirty with operational details and choices involved in counter-insurgency practices.