Michael Maiello's picture

    The European Union Should Collapse

    I admit that, years ago, I was entranced by what Jeremy Rifkin called "The European Dream," which was not just a monetary union but, in his mind, a political union that could, unlike the United States, expand almost without limit to include an ever widening periphery, someday stretching as far south as northern Africa.

    While nothing has theoretically changed since I met Rifkin back in 2004, such rhetoric seems silly now.  The center of the European Union is now less than willing to help the current periphery hold on.  Fevered talk about countries seeking to join the EU has been replaced with fevered talk about countries potentially leaving it, an event not planned for during the EU's formation.

    My headline here is deliberately provocative.  I think that a strong EU has a lot to offer the world.  But I wonder what it has to offer the peoples of Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal at the moment.  It's also true that rhetoric can swing wildly in a couple of years.  Give us a global boom and we'll be hearing about countries clamoring to join the EU again.  Remember, most of the EU countries in debt trouble now are only there because of the recession.  Ireland, Portugal, and Spain were in fine shape heading into the recession.  Italy was not in great shape but its deficits were falling -- it was just a few more year to great shape.  Greece was... well... Greece got bamboozled by foreign bankers and its own elite.

    Martin Wolf at The Financial Times has been one of the best advocates for having the EU save itself, possibly by issuing Eurobonds and by having the European Central Bank become a true lender of last resort, in the manner of the U.S. Federal Reserve.  But even Wolf scares me when he says things like this:

    "I fear that austerity without end will bring about a return to the unstable populist politics the European Union was designed to prevent. That could shatter the eurozone and, with it, the EU, thereby ending the most successful attempt to build peace and prosperity in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire."

    Now, I get what Wolf is saying.  The unstable politics of Europe are directly responsible for the travesties of the 20th century, from World War I right on through the break-up of Yugoslavia.  I get that when he uses the word "populist," it's not the same thing as a union driven recall election in Wisconsin.

    But, then... and this is what Jeremy Rifkin (who was an adviser to the EU before the adoption of the euro, right alongside the conservative economist Robert Mundell, who advocates for a one world currency) failed to grasp: Spain is not to Germany what Wisconsin is to South Carolina.  The various states within the U.S. are culturally, economically and politically more in tune with one another than the various member countries of the EU.  The union of states has a lot more to it than currency.

    To be fair, Rifkin always knew this.  His vision of an ever-expanding Eurozone was based on the will of people to assimilate and to accept one another.  The current Eurozone countries can get there.  But I kind of wonder whether or not they're ready.  The U.S. is a young country but if you judge it by uninterrupted democracy (heh, I know, laugh with me about that) then it's an old one compared to Ireland, Spain, Italy, Germany or Greece, which have all dealt with dictators, monarchs or foreign conquerors, within recent memory.

    I wonder whether or not these democracies have had time to truly form before they bequeathed so much authority to super-national financial authorities.  In a sense, the U.S. deals with these same tensions with regards to its international trade agreements.  But, the U.S. has military weight and a reserve currency to throw around.  I imagine that in Greece a sense of helplessness and paranoia would be a natural reaction to current events.

    Not all populism is a bad thing. Argentina's decision, in 2001, to depeg its currency from the dollar and to tell the vulture speculators that had purchased its debt at deep discounts to take a hike, was quickly rewarded by a return to growth.  More recently, Iceland performed the same trick.

    The Eurozone will return to growth again someday.  Fortunes don't reverse quickly on this scale, but they reverse dramatically.  At some point in the future of Dag, when we are all justly famous for our insights, we'll be discussing whether or not the Democratic Republic of Libya can conform to standards of European cosmopolitanism.  But, for now... if the Euro cannot serve the interests of the people of so many Eurozone countries, it must shrink.  Populism is not always scary.

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    Comments

    I'm not sure that I should throw this out as an early comment, pardon me if it is an off-point diversion, I don't want discussion to veer in the wrong direction, but while I think you have made some very good points that are worth considering, you may have underestimated the differences when it comes to economic problems of different groups separated by geographical borders such as between U.S. states versus European countries.

    Spain is not to Germany what Wisconsin is to South Carolina.

    In the early seventies during an oil crisis there were cost controls in affect. I don't recall the details but, because of price freeze regulations, Texas oil companies were forced to sell oil and gas to New York for a long standing low price while they were able to raise prices they charged Texas customers. This pissed off the locals, at least in Cowtown. A very common bumper sticker in Texas which referred to N.Y. said, "Let 'em Freeze in the Dark". 


    I don't think that's off topic at all.  I hesitated to write that part because I know there's no way that national policies work equally well for every state.  But the New York response to "Let 'em Freeze in the Dark" would be... "let them live without access to the federal tax dollars generated by New Yorkers."  That's not something that Ireland can so easily say to France, or vice versa.


    I'd separate Greece from the other cases - the Greeks were simply irresponsible and used their membership both to steal and to bash Turkey (Cyprus talks, et al). Plus have only 2 industries, shipping & tourism >50% of GDP. They should be out of the Eurozone.

    Spain grew a structural overdependence on the housing market, but was relatively stable economically. Other countries like Ireland had admirable growth. The EU's economic response for a freak occurrence has been ass-backwards and destructive. 

    I don't think this reflects much on the goals and success of the EU itself. Countries of the EU get along better than ever, integration is smooth, the consolidated policies have been successful, a reigning justice system brings some order - it's hard to see what not to like, aside from the typical concerns about too much bureaucracy (though spending at the top levels is much smaller than US gov spending).

    The EU is not the Euro, and the Euro/EU economic policy has been a half effort from the beginning, with incomplete authority for fiscal policy & true spending effectiveness. The latest crisis says either take 2 steps forward, or 4 steps back.


    The one parallel I would point to in the "Wisconsin/SC" vs "Germany/Greece" dynamic can be found in the Savings and Loan Crisis of the mid-to-late eighties. This was a bailout involving unprecedented amounts of federal tax dollars going to states like TX, CO, FL, AZ, CA, and others that had exercised considerably less regulatory discipline of their own S&L industry than did states like Wisconsin. I remember at the time how it felt almost biblical; like a retelling of the Prodigal Son story as we in WI were compelled to pass along our hard-earned tax dollars to these other, more "profligate" states. It was so clearly unfair at so many levels. But there was also never a question whether it should be done, and most certainly never a re-think of allowing these states to remain in the Union.

    The EU is not anywhere near such stability as a republic. And I remain uncertain how it can withstand the challenges to its integrity as it maintains a demand for extreme austerity from member states whose populations might be more inclined to tell Goldman Sachs to go fuck themselves, as did Argentina and Iceland in the examples you cite. I'm just not sure whether Germany or Greece have yet gotten religion as required to make it all work. It would seem instead there is nothing but self-interest of the individual states maintaining the EU bond at this point, and these interests seem to be irreparably at odds in this crisis.


    One huge difference is that the United States are actually really federalized, with a system that gives all of the states a say. (The small-state advantages built into the Constitution never look so good as when you think about the Eurozone counter-example, where a bunch of smaller countries are just stuck with whatever France and Germany can agree on.)

    I think part of the idea of the Eurozone was that economic unification would naturally create more integration, without anybody having to work out an actual political unification. (It's a market-based solution.) But not only does economic unification not lead to political unification, it turns out not even to lead to real economic unification. Bad times.


    Actually there's quite a lot a single country can veto. Thus the EU constitution went down in flames.


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