The Bishop and the Butterfly: Murder, Politics, and the End of the Jazz Age
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    Gareth Porter's Take on the 'New' Afghanistan Strategy

    Veteran journalist and author Gareth Porter was recently interviewed by Paul Jay on The Real News network; Porter  just returned from Afghanistan two weeks ago.   It's a ten-and-a-half minute interview, and well worth the dab of time.  He makes some cogent points, some I've never considered, and answered some big questions many of us have had.  I will announce the first large answer that has bothered me for a year now:

    Porter claims that an aide to General Stanley McChrystal blithely told him (in Kabul) that Taliban does not equal Al Qaeda, and that the two have different interests, different constituencies, and different goals, and they are not merging at all.  And that in some important ways, the Taliban are ready to 'throw Al-Qaeda under the bus.'

    For me, the newest thought Porter posited was his contention that the new strategy was designed as a PR tool to convince Americans of the necessity to negotiate with the Taliban.  He spoke of the idea of 15,000 troops to 'clear and hold, then develop' a town of 80,000, and how difficult/impossible it would be to do that nation-wide.  He said it would be lovely if it worked as leverage with the Taliban and the Afghan citizens, but that scenario is predicated on there being an effective government, viable governmental officials and institutions, viable and effective security organs, and none of this is so.

     

    Jay and Porter discussed the eventuality of turning over security to Afghans, and Porter said:

     

    Even if they are not Tajiks and Uzbeks, and they are say, Pashtuns, they are going to be from another part of the country, they will be urban Pashtuns, not rural, ...who can communicate effectively with the local people.

     

    They further discussed (Pashtun) Hamid Karzai's desire of several years that he wants, and means, to negotiate  with Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, whom the Americans refuse to deal with.  They say he has the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands, and we won't negotiate with him.

     

    Paul Jay asked Porter to clarify his thoughts on the PR effect further and Porter says:

     

    If you project on the basis of Marjah to the future operations that are going to be similarly portrayed as victories, then I think that is correct; what they're up to now is doing a kind of Petraeus operation of portraying what's happening on the ground as verification of the success of US strategy.

     And that in sixteen months or so, from an advertised position of strength, announce negotiations with the Taliban; that this administration has been doing 'positive' things on the ground, therefore has the right to negotiate with them.

    When asked about what the Afghan people wants, he says he relies on the history of the nation being impatient with foreign occupations over the years; you don't get the impression that he thinks that's lessened, but even when NATO forces leave, there is a realization by Afghan leaders that there will still be other forces like Iran, Russia, India continuing to support anti-Taliban forces.

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     Porter's take makes sense in light of  the 'arrested No.2 Taliban' breaking news that isn't altogether (and I can't find the links again, drat it!) what it seems, and the campaign to show  (or pretend-show-for-Public-Relations) that Pakistan is playing nice these days, or at least giving the US some of what we require.

    I would also point out how the MSM utterly bought into the Petraeus  plan for Anbar Province in Iraq, capitalizing on many events (you all know them) that made his 'surge' look grand, rather than the cynical ploy that it was. (And no, I will not pursue unwinding this 'conventional wisdom' here.)

    If we believe Porter, and I do, then we can ask ourselves if the politics of it is worth it, or could the President have given one of his grand speeches, explained and convinces Americans of the necessity of negotiating with the Taliban, rather than pursuing this course.

    That the Military and the Pundits and Politicians worked so avidly to conflate Taliban and Al Qaeda has now officially bitten them in the arse; but at least it did serve to keep those military billions flowing.