The Bishop and the Butterfly: Murder, Politics, and the End of the Jazz Age
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    The Ground Beneath Our Feet

    Note to the reader: I had originally planned to divide what follows as a series of posts in order to better present the ideas herein.  However, I've decided to simply cram it all into one post in the interest of getting the ideas out there and hopefully sparking a discussion.  I know that this isn't in the interest of good writing, but I think the prospect of getting these ideas out, here and now, is a more pressing matter.

    Also, I want to especially address this post as a response of sorts to much of what I've been reading here recently, particularly to recent posts by coatesddestor23, Dan Kervick and Another Trope regarding the current economic mess and capitalism in general.  I hope that my contribution here will help to further that discussion.

    ***

    Part 1 - "Do we hate each other that much?"

    That's what I remember thinking to myself after hearing Rick Santelli's famous on-air rant that helped spark national interest in the Tea Party.  Santelli was fuming at the notion of bailing out homeowners in the midst of the greatest financial crisis in 80 some odd years.  The injustice in his crosshair was the possibility that he might end up subsidizing the bathroom addition of some irresponsible neighbor.

    But I was thinking of John Thain's infamous executive bathroom at the now defunct Merrill Lynch, replete with a $35,000 toilet.  Santelli didn't rant about that.  Or, if he did, I must have missed it.

    I kept thinking about that rant as I watched support for Tea build up over the following year.  There was a clear, familiar tension here.  Once the banks had been successfully propped up, it was back to business as usual and along very familiar lines: big government versus free enterprise.

    All of the familiar cultural heroes were back too, from Roosevelt to Rand.  Right to Left, people were engaging in long practiced rhetorical rituals.  You know.  Going Galt.  New Dealing.

    I started thinking a lot about the tension between these forces, which I've come to regard more or less as the tension between the individual and the collective.  I see our economic problems along these lines.  I see our environmental problems along these lines.  Of course, all of this is steeped in our politics, in which battles are fought almost entirely along these lines.

    How to reconcile the two has become something of an obsession for me.  I can see clearly the tension between the two, but it is primarily because of the need for both that one or the other hasn't simply taken over.  Large parts of the world have now engaged in bold experiments toward both extremes, and yet we still seem to be facing some very considerable problems.  But I think that the failure of these systems is precisely in relying on too extreme a version of one or the other concept - extreme collectivism in the case of communism and extreme individualism in the case of capitalism.

    But back in 2009 I still had no idea how we might approach a reconciliation of these seemingly opposing forces.  So, I started with a concept that I thought at least got the big picture right.

    Part 2 - "Spaceship Earth"

    Though he isn't particularly well known these days, there was an economist named Kenneth Boulding that I happen to admire.  Boulding exemplified some characteristics that I think are lacking among many economists.  In particular, he had a sense of humor, but he also cared a lot about things like peace and equity.

    If you study economics these days, it's a very technical subject that is mired in analytics pointed at maximizing efficiency.  That's good as far as it goes, but efficiency isn't the only concern in the world.  In the wake of the Occupy, this seems to be something that people are waking up to right now.

    I think that's a good thing.  I would guess that Boulding would have thought so, too.  In particular, I think it's useful to consider Boulding's essay entitled "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth."  In the essay, Boulding describes two economic paradigms.  The first, arguably still our current paradigm, is the cowboy economy.  Think of the westward expansion in the US.  Rugged individuals.  True grit.  Bootstraps.

    And land.  Lots of land that had not yet been claimed by the forces of Western civilization.

    Boulding goes on to point out that the cowboy paradigm really only works until the frontier is settled.  After that, there isn't much room for all of us to run around and act like proper cowboys.  So, where does leave us?

    Enter "Spaceship Earth."  The idea is simple.  We're all on this rock together and somehow we have to make it work.

    Boulding's idea here seems to line right up with a lot of the problems we're beginning to face, especially with respect for the environment and natural resources.  In the cowboy paradigm, there's always more room to roam.  On Spaceship Earth, we've got a different role entirely: maintain life support.

    It is, however, quite clear that there are many modern cowboys who aren't ready to turn over their pistols and play a different game.  And it would also seem that their philosophy has a wide enough appeal to stymie the dawning of the Age of Aquarius.  Boulding had, I felt, provided the proper conceptual model, at least in the big picture sense, but I still lacked a way to reconcile the individual and collective.  That is, until now.

    Part 3 - "The Ground Beneath Our Feet"

    What if I told that there existed a political economy that reconciled these two forces, without appealing to failed systems like laissez-faire or central planning?  And that this political economy was proposed by an American who, a century ago, self-published what became at the time the most popular book in America?  And that he nearly became the mayor of New York City, losing narrowly to the Tammany Hall machine, but besting a young Teddy Roosevelt?  And that his ideas inspired the popular board game Monopoly and became influential in the progressive and labor movements in the US and the UK?

    What if I told you all that and that his proposal is simple, economically sound and could be potentially phased in, either nationally or locally, starting right now?  That there is good reason to believe that his proposal can actually increase efficiency and equity without sacrificing one for the other?  That it provides and sound basis for regulating the environment?  That it can potentially reconcile the tension between the needs of the individual and the needs of the collective?

    I am sure you would probably think that's all too good to be true.  But then maybe you, like so many, have never heard of Henry George, who proposed a simple, but fundamental tweak to the political economy we all know and love.  Henry George argued that land, and essentially all natural resources, belong to all people collectively.

    Philosophically, this a rejection of Locke's labor theory of property and an affirmation of the critique levied at Locke by Rousseau.  The implication here is that since land belongs to all of us equally, that the ground rent is owed to the community.  This is the tax base of the community, meant to provide for its needs.

    George parts with both Marx and the modern neoclassicists in making this distinction between land  and capital, but I think it's far more profound than it might seem at first brush.  Obviously, land is distinct from capital in that it cannot be created by labor, but where modern economists dismiss this as a conceptual triviality, it would seem that this is not entirely so.

    For one thing, taxes on competitive markets create inefficiencies in the form of loss of surplus and in the form of deadweight loss, where the market basically underperforms potential:

    Those two white triangles in the middle represent the deadweight loss.  However, a tax on something with a fixed supply, like land, looks different:

    Two key things are different here: there is no deadweight loss, or economic inefficiency, produced by this tax and the tax also cannot be passed on from the producer to the consumer.  This relates to an important concept deployed by George, that of the "unearned increment."  To George, there's a big difference between the founder of a start-up in Silicon Valley and Donald Trump.  Trump's infamous real estate speculation blighted cities like New York back in the 80s and 90s, rather than actually adding productive value to the economy.

    George and his followers argue that his tax helps tamp down on land speculation.  That's worth considering the wake of the housing bubble.  In fact, there are modern followers of George who argue that the modern business cycle actually relates to an 18 year, land-based boom and bust cycle that goes back 200 years.

    George's ideas have also found support with modern economists as diverse as Milton Friedman and Joseph Stiglitz.  Friedman called George's land tax the "least bad" of all taxes, which I'm pretty sure is the exact same thing he said about constitutional democracy as a political system.  Einstein was a fan.  So were Leo Tolstoy, Clarence Darrow and, probably unsurprisingly, George Bernard Shaw.

    Economists like UC Riverside's Mason Gaffney, University of Santa Clara's Fred Foldvary and UMKC's Michael Hudson have all been speaking out for years in favor of a George-style land tax.  Gaffney has chronicled the way in which Prop. 13 has been devastating to the state of California, but also to the nation as it became a major battle won in repealing taxes on property.  California has certainly been a harbinger of deficit, debt and political gridlock for the nation at large.

    So, in the modern day a Georgist economic regime would seek, first and foremost, to tax economic rents as close to 100% as possible.  Fred Foldvary suggests something a little less than that, maybe 75%, but the point is to make sure that rent-seeking is minimized throughout the economy and that public services are provided for.  Then, the second goal would be to tax negative externalities, like air pollution.  Any other natural resource, including things like broadcast spectrum, could be similarly taxed.

    Though never implemented to the extent that George described, his ideas have been implemented at various levels in place like the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore and even Pittsburgh.  The Henry George Theorem, still taught in some graduate public finance courses, indicates that government expenditures are always roughly equivalent to land rents, indicating that land alone, not to mention resources like gas, oil and radio spectrum, should be more than enough to fund the desired level of government.

    So, think of it: A political economy that was homegrown here in America, that recognizes that what a person creates is theirs while simultaneously acknowledging that we all have a stake in the planet, wherein lies the potential to create both a fairer and​ more prosperous system and the only people who have to lose anything are the Donald Trumps of the world.

    In the view of Henry George, it's not the 99% versus the 1%.  There is no squishy moralizing over potential ill-gottens required here.  No one needs to demonize so-called job creators, but neither must we lionize they of the "unearned increment," who simply extract wealth from the system via economic rents.

    Anyhow, that's where I'm at now.  I know I haven't been very active on a Dag over the past year, but I still stop by and read frequently.  I certainly haven't stopped looking for ways to make a better world.  I may be wrong, but I think this might really be an answer to a lot of the problems we're facing right now, including the divisive political environment.

    I know that although Dag can sometimes feel like just another divisive political environment there is more diversity here than there is true division.  You're all intelligent.  You all give a shit.  I therefore graciously await my savaging.

    Happy Holidays.

    ***

    For those interested, here are a few items for consideration:

    An essay on George by his granddaughter.

    George's Progress and Poverty.

    A simple graphical depiction of how George's political economy differs.

    Mason Gaffney's Corruption of Economics, an intriguing re-injection of George into American economic history that has him going toe-to-toe with the early wonks of neoclassical economics.  Also in PDF.

    Topics: 

    Comments

    I guess I could have been shorter up top and just said, "Sorry if this is a crappy read, but I've been spinning my wheels on trying to get the writing together and I think the discussion is timely."

    Anyway, I wanted to promote some discussion by again mentioning Trope's recent post.  It had a bunch of food for thought and several quotes that I was planning on using in this post, particularly the quotes from Rousseau and Tolstoy.  I've been doing a bunch of reading and taking notes on this stuff lately, trying to organize my thoughts and write about them, but Trope's post was one in a series by a bunch of different writers here that made me think, "Just post something now.  If this discussion is going to happen at Dag, if these ideas are worth any airing there, then this is the time."

    Here's another quote from Henry George that I just stumbled across.  It's funny, because I had no idea that there might actually be a direct relationship between George and Boulding until finding this:

    It is a well-provisioned ship, this on which we sail through space. If the bread and beef above decks seem to grow scarce, we but open a hatch and there is a new supply, of which before we never dreamed. And very great command over the services of others comes to those who as the hatches are opened are permitted to say, "This is mine!"


    I only recently stumbled on George, while reading a survey of economists (a famous one but the title and the author escapes me at the moment)... I like the idea and I do think you're putting your taxes in the right place.  We really shouldn't be trying to sell rights to natural resources like land, spectrum and water -- we should treat everyone as a renter and the world, or at least the country, as the collective owner.  Yes, that means the Trumps of the world don't get to flip casinos for a living.  But they can still build and manage casinos and make the money from that.  Not as fun, I know, and you have to keep the darned things from going bankrupt, but life's rough.

    As to your first question... do we really hate each other that much?  Yes, some of us do.  Hey, I'll admit that I get jealous when it seems like somebody else gets a lucky break that wasn't afforded to me.  I can't stand that Chelsea Clinton, at 31, is on the board of a public company and has an on air job at NBC.  Now that I live in New York and have seen what real wealth is, well... I can tell you that I'm easily irked when some one my age or younger gets to jump ahead of the line professionally because of wealth or family connections.

    But, Santelli.  What was he so worried about?  That somebody might get away with keeping a house that was a little more than they could afford?  Hell, from a purely pragmatic, self interested perspective you absolutely do not want your neighbor to be foreclosed upon, even if your neighbor is the most irresponsible jerk on the planet, because it drives down the value of every house on the block.  And you don't want foreclosures to happen hundreds of miles away from you either because, as you say, we're sharing a spaceship.  We're actually better off individually when all the passengers are happy.

    Except that sometimes those sitting in first class don't think that way and they don't worry about the rest of us riding in steerage.  Maybe the George solution does get u beyond that divide.  There's a book sitting in my office that's a compendium of the world's largest landowners.  I'll post back here tomorrow with who a few of them are and we can speculate as to how opposed they might be.


    That would be worth considering.  Obviously, those with the most land holdings are going to be the most opposed to this.  Gaffney argues this is a group that, probably unsurprisingly, correlates very well with the top one tenth of one percent.

    And then there's the problem of reforming a system where the rentier class has developed considerable political clout.  Their political and economic power are now self-reinforcing.  How is that cycle broken?


    It's interesting.  I have never myself felt a lot of envy toward the rich.  Their lifestyles and the accouterments of their social positions repel me.  I have never craved social power, an abundance of toys and luxuries, or any significant notoriety.  The idea of being on television or having magazine articles written about me, or otherwise being the object of social attention rather horrifies me, as does the idea of being on the board of some corporation or being forced by my position to hobnob and socialize with the movers of capitalist society.   I like getting useful things, but never wanted more than my fair, equal share of them.   I always wanted a life of mildly comfortable peace and relative anonymity, nothing like the life lived by a Clinton.

    What irks me about the rich is not what they have, but what others don't.  I don't believe that the rich are necessary, or that they create a rising tide that lifts all boats or a trickling down bonanza for the many, or any of the rest of those legends.  While I don't think we live in a zero-sum society exactly, I don't think it is as far from zero-sum as contemporary neoliberal doctrine suggests.  The rich have the abundance that they have because they have insisted on denying to many, many others the wealth comprising that abundance.   The woman who works in the mailroom down the hall from me has to struggle through life, with a measly salary, little hope for better and a husband crushed down by several diseases and infirmities, so that some human lump of money can wear absurd suits and live in absurd houses and indulge a taste for absurd toys and attentions and indulgences and diversions.   Such lives of pointless and wasteful abundance are made possible by the immiseration of the crawling many.   The rich aren't enviable; they're disgusting.


    I don't believe that the rich are necessary, or that they create a rising tide that lifts all boats or a trickling down bonanza for the many, or any of the rest of those legends.  While I don't think we live in a zero-sum society exactly, I don't think it is as far from zero-sum as contemporary neoliberal doctrine suggests.  The rich have the abundance that they have because they have insisted on denying to many, many others the wealth comprising that abundance.

    These are important assertions, but they would be decisive if we could show they were objectively true.

    For example, it may not be that the rich raise all boats, but perhaps the rich are an inevitable by-product of a rising tide.

    Or perhaps inequality is the inevitable result of a productive society, but not this much inequality. I tend to think this is the point.

    The zero-sum argument is important to the progressive position, I think. But is it really true that the rich are rich because they've denied large swaths of their wealth to the rest of us? Can we show that? Can we show how they do that?


    Thank you for introducing Boulding to me. I had not read him before.

    The distinction between the "Cowboy Earth" and the "Spaceship Earth" intersects with what Veblen said in his Theory of the Leisure Class about the gap between the meritocracy created through the "instinct of workmanship" and the culture shaping the lives of major entrepreneurs. Maybe the lack of reversibility you make note of in the Santelli rant has something to do with this:

    This vicarious consumption practiced by the household of the middle and lower classes can not be counted as a direct expression of the leisure-class scheme of life, since the household of this pecuniary grade does not belong within the leisure class. It is rather that the leisure-class scheme of life here comes to an expression at the second remove. The leisure class stands at the head of the social structure in point of reputability; and its manner of life and its standards of worth therefore afford the norm of reputability for the community. The observance of these standards, in some degree of approximation, becomes incumbent upon all classes lower in the scale. In modern civilized communities the lines of demarcation between social classes have grown vague and transient, and wherever this happens the norm of reputability imposed by the upper class extends its coercive influence with but slight hindrance down through the social structure to the lowest strata. The result is that the members of each stratum accept as their ideal of decency the scheme of life in vogue in the next higher stratum, and bend their energies to live up to that ideal. On pain of forfeiting their good name and their self-respect in case of failure, they must conform to the accepted code, at least in appearance.

    I don't mean to give Veblen any kind of last word on the matter but think there is value in his idea of "vicarious consumption". There are different kinds of competition that easily get conflated when considering economic models. With that in mind, what I like about Boulding's approach is that he is asking us to become more "selfish" in order to become more "cooperative."

    I have to learn more about the land rent idea but the first thing that occurs to me is that land use by large corporations always bring economies of scale to the issue. The notion of severance taxes in mining are an example of communities recognizing the limits of taxing ownership.

    Another thought about land use has to do with urban planning. To get to something like the "collective" needed to change how cities are remodeled seems to me an essential requirement of stepping on board the Spaceship Earth.

     


    Veblen and George were contemporaries and expressed many similar ideas.  I think there's something to the notion of vicarious consumption.  At least, it seems evident in our culture.  But I also think there's a narrative at play that has to do with convincing people that Thain's consumption is fundamentally meritorious whereas a neighbor's bathroom remodel on a second mortgage isn't.

    To be clear about what George proposed, it was a taxed on the unimproved value of land.  This excludes any kind of development on the land, which would be considered capital investment and ideally free of taxation.  Another way to think about it is paying what a landlord receives in rent, or nearly all of it in order to compensate landlords for collection, to the community and/or state.  I don't know much about the particulars of severance taxes in mining, but I do know that this kind of taxation is deployed on oil resources in countries like Norway and even in the US in the state of Alaska.

    As for urban planning, advocates of George's tax argue that it tamps down on land speculation and prices while encouraging more efficient development.  This site is dedicated to explaining that sort of thing from the land tax perspective.


    There is a lot to absorb and inter-relate here. 

    Two things come to mind right away.  First regarding:

    I started thinking a lot about the tension between these forces, which I've come to regard more or less as the tension between the individual and the collective.

    On his blog Some Static Ideas, Oxy Mora brought up the tension between the cooperative and competitive approaches or perspectives, which is close to the tension you bring up.  For me, as I mention in my response to him, the evolutionary perspective - how we developed as we moved into and through the homo sapiens sapien phase - is critical here. Both bring a certain advantage to a particular individual and group attempting to survive in a hostile world.  Both are woven into our genetic make-up.  Of course, language comes into the mix and we experience these two competing impulse through the symbolic system in our head.  Things really start to get mixed up then.  Culturally, the extent of individual autonomy and separatedness plays a big part - is this "I" a whole or part of a larger whole, so mix of the two, shifting back and forth depending on the circumstances?  Nature and nurture.

    The other thing that comes to mind regarding the property issue here in America is the Fifth Amendment's "....nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

    What constitutes a taking is not clearly defined.  I'm no constitutional lawyer, but I see this as the biggest hurdle in George's plan.  In part because the big landholders can whip a large segment of the 99% into a frenzy over the socialist commie undermining of the US Constitution. 


    Implementing George's tax doesn't require actually taking land or any other property from anyone.  All it requires is shifting the tax burden from capital and wages to real property.  The state of New Hampshire, as an example, gets something like two thirds of its tax revenue from property.

    Another way to conceive of George's tax is that the economic rent collected by landlords would instead be collected as tax.  Owners of buildings could still collect rent for their capital holdings, ie the building, but the ground rent would be paid to the community or state.

    There is little question in my mind that the rentier class would oppose this shift.  However, I do think that it's possible to sell this kind of reform to the political center on the basis of a reduction in taxes on their wages and investments.


    Just thinking in terms of the resistance such a proposal would face - I personally like the idea - it seems it falls upon the semantics.  The concept seems to rest on the idea of "nationalizing" all of the land, and then charging a rental fee for the right to stay on the land.  Since it is the people's land, once someone has paid their annual rental fee, can they do as they please with the land as it is when someone purchases some land today as long it is within the regulations established (such as the wetlands regs mentioned in my blog) - or will they have to turn for the government's approval in the same way I have to ask my landlord's permission if I want to dig up the lawn and put in a garden?  This is why people might perceive it as a taking.  The owner no longer has the freedom to do as they as please with his or her property because it is technically no longer their property.


    I would encourage you, if interested, to read more of the above links I added.  Land-based taxes have been used, with what seems like great success, in a number of cities and states around the world, though never to the extent that George proposed.  AFAIK, it was the sole form of taxation in America in 1792.  But it doesn't have anything to do with nationalizing land or the government granting permission to plant gardens.  All it means is that the ground rents currently accrued to a landlord would, either wholly or in part, be accrued instead to the state or community as tax.

    However, I have no doubt that the rentier class would attempt to paint the policy proposal in the way you suggest.  Even so, how successful would that push be?  The state of New Hampshire already has most of its tax based on land, about two thirds.  The city of Pittsburgh has used these taxes successfully.  And there are other examples.  FWIW, Marx himself regarded George as a solid capitalist.


    Thanks, DF. Thought pieces like this one are great, and I really encourage them.

    I'm hesitant to respond because I haven't spent enough time understanding the proposal, but maybe a challenge and response will help me to make sense of it. I can see how it would work in a simple neighborhood with big houses and small houses, but it seems problematic when you get into multi-unit dwellings.

    It seems to me that there are two options. Either the government builds the dwellings and leases out the apartments, or else private developers, like our friend Trump, build and lease them.

    I think that anyone who has lived under the thumb of the Soviets can tell you that option one has some serious flaws.

    As for option two, sure, you could levy high land taxes on big developments, but the additional cost will be passed down to the renters, and the result will be a very regressive (albeit indirect) tax.

    Am I missing something?


    I think I just need to be more clear about what George was proposing, which is a good argument for taking more time in writing this stuff up.  As I mentioned up above to Trope, implementing this reform does not require anything like government ownership of all property.  It's simply that ground rents, the rental value of the unimproved land, would accrue to the community or state as tax.  Buildings can still be built, owned and rented by private owners.  They would pay no tax on those capital investments.

    As for the tax being regressive for being passed onto the renters, that's the whole point of the second graph.  Taxes on goods with perfectly inelastic supply can't be passed on to the consumer from the producer.  Quite the contrary, supporters of the tax argue that it is inherently progressive because it is paid most heavily by the holders of the most valuable land.  Indeed, George's tax used to be a plank of progressive activism a century ago.


    I guess that I'm thinking of a place like New York City, where rents are already astronomical. In some sense, it makes sense to charge New Yorkers more, since they hold the most valuable land, but we don't all have investment banker incomes. We're just willing to put more of our income into rent. Changing from income to land tax would, I think, force us out of the city even more rapidly. And in general, it would hit people in high cost-of-living coastal areas much harder than in the hinterlands.


    Though we might make up for some of it if you dropped the state and city income and sales taxes.  If local taxes stay where they are, big problem for renters.


    Think it through more.  Why would the rental rates increase if a portion of the ground rent is paid to the government?  The supply of land is inelastic.  Whether the ground rent is collected by a private entity or the government is non-distortionary.  It does not affect the market value of housing adversely because it cannot move the supply curve.  Likewise, it has no affect on the demand for housing.  What difference does it make to you if the rent you pay is pocketed by a private entity or government?

    Quite the contrary, there is a positive correlation noted between greater reliance on property taxes and higher income levels.  This confirms rather than contradicts the prediction that shifting tax away from productive sources and onto property should have the effect of increasing surplus and therefore incomes.


    I think that anyone who has lived under the thumb of the Soviets can tell you that option one has some serious flaws.

    ​I really would appreciate some elaboration here.  Is it your implication that because the Soviets screwed up government management, all governments screw it up?


    I think that the factors that made Soviet construction so horrible apply to all governmental bureaucracies. Nor is it just the Soviets. Take a look at the history of government housing projects. I don't think that anyone should build residential buildings who doesn't have to a) live in them, or b) sell them.


    Yikes!


    Still would like to know specific factors.  Corruption? cronyism? Are there any that some private contractors have not also been guilty of?  

    How do you feel about REITs?  Why not think of each government jurisdiction a REIT due its share of income derived from the property it claims?  

    We were caught up in a duel to the death between two distinct economic models for so long that most people do not even think about whether there are only two possibilities.  Definitely arrested development in that area.  I have been trying to think of alternatives or hybrids that might move us beyond them.  It helps to understand how others are thinking which is why I ask.


    I was speaking specifically about public housing developments, not subsidies or abatements for private developers. In those cases, properties still operate according to market principles, just with public support, which I enthusiastically endorse.

    I confess to know little about the history of government housing, but my sense has been that when governments build residential buildings, ideological and public engineering objectives tend to override the residential interests of the tenants. So the Soviets created gray Stalinist skyscrapers to glorify the simple proletariat, while the West built Le Corbusier superblocks that we're finally tearing down.


    Ah, it's the architecture!

    Now I get it and agree.  Something more Gaudi-like would have been better than the   antiseptic and existential Le Corbusier designs.  More human and way people friendlier than the dungeon grays of the USSR.  

    As for financing the whole thing, housing vouchers are definitely preferable to building supermax ghettos but I also think it would be good for the government to be able to build and lease both residential and commercial real estate in direct competition with the private sector rather than subsidizing and over regulating it.   By both setting and meeting industry standards, private as well as public housing costs and quality could improve.  


    Yeah, with the caveat that it's much more than the facade. It would have made little difference if Gaudi had decorated the walls of Caprini-Green. The whole structure was misconceived.

    I can see some advantages to limited public housing (as opposed to subsidized housing), but as a general rule, I wouldn't trust the government to build my house.


    I dig this post.  A couple of initial thoughts.  First, let me get this out of the way.  And land. Lots of land that no one had claimed yet.  I don't think your meaning is lost on me, but I don't think people should write things like that.  It's not true and it's insensitive.

    Community Land Trusts approach the problem you describe in a similar way.  The thrust is that the land is democratized while the improvements take on a variety of characteristics.  They are often privately owned.  They can be traded, but the land can't be.  I'm all for some sensible, progressive tax reform, but this has been going on a while and it's a great way to organize some of our relationships with property.

    At the end of the day, though, all of our natural resources will need to be democratized if we stand a chance.  That means no one gets to own a mountain or a forest or a river.  Sure, tax those relationships with the Earth that a small few enjoy in the meantime.  I just don't see it as a long term solution.  They'll have to give them up or we'll have to somehow end them. 

     


    I appreciate the critique.  I've updated the post so that it's perhaps more sensitive and more accurate.

    CLTs are an interesting way to go and certainly a viable approach for local communities.  However, that still leaves the rentier class with a lot of surplus that they can continue to plow into controlling the political process.  Even so, I've always been a big admirer of MLK, especially for his later work on issues of poverty.  CLTs and other proposals of that era certainly seem to acknowledge and work with the principles that George had in mind.

    It occurs to me to mention here that in some sense the the land and resources are already democratized.  After all, we don't really get to "own" land in the sovereign sense.  Whether we're talking about your average homeowner or a corporation and all of its land holdings, what is really owned is a collection of rights: rights to land use, water use, mineral use, use of air space, etc.  Who grants these rights?  The US government, which retains powers like eminent domain and seizure in the case of certain crimes.


    Nice work.  

    I certainly have no objection if the Feds want to add a couple of mils to my property tax bill, as long as they are not too greedy.  My state, county, city and local school districts all take a bit that way, what's one more.  I always thought of my property taxes and insurance as a form of rent.

    I do wonder if George would make the same proposal  given the changes in what is expected of the federal government and general demographics since the 19th century.  

    This definitely requires more thought.  Thanks.

     


    Please chew on it and let me know what you think!


    I think you might want to go after many other rents as well - which run much wider than land.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_rent

    As well as pollution and other "bads."

    - Q


    Absolutely.  I thought I had mentioned that in my post, but I guess I left that out.  I meant to mention Pigou, who was apparently also influenced by George.

    Anyhow, the modern supporters of George's tax advocate the collection of economic rents as tax from land, mineral resources, the radio spectrum, etc.  Any natural resource that doesn't come into being as a result of labor.  The second economic goal would be forcing corporations to internalize negative externalities via a Pigouvian tax.

    EDIT: Here's Stiglitz outlining the same points.


    DF, it seems to be that you are employing both a broad and a narrow definition of rent at the same time when you develop George's idea into modern-day proposals to tax all or most-rent seeking.

    In the contemporary context, we people are talking about rent-seeking, they are really talking about all forms of profit - that is, all of an enterprise's earnings that exceed the amount needed to purchase, maintain and employ the factors of production.  If you think through, then, what it would mean to assess a 100% or even 75% tax on rents, it turns out to be a very radical proposal indeed.  That's fine, but it's misleading to present it as just some kind of underlying land tax.

    Also, I don't understand why you think a land tax will not be passed on to customers.  Any cost a business incurs will at least in part be passed on to its customers.

    Also, after you make so good a start in pointing out that there are many values to be considered other than efficiency, but then appeal to the alleged inefficiencies of taxes on competitive markets as a reason to oppose all of the other kinds of taxes.   Taxes of most kinds will increase the cost of providing goods and services, or will decrease the revenue that is earned by individuals and enterprises.  The question is just whether the aggregate utility of the public spending enabled by the tax exceeds the aggregate disutility of the taxation itself.


    Read Q's link above RE: economic rent.  It confirms what I am saying:

    As long as there is sufficient accounting profit, governments can collect natural economic rent on resources (such as land and minerals) for the purpose of public finance without risking the adverse effects caused by taxes on production or consumption

    ​Yes, I do think that perfectly inelastic supply has the effect I've described.  It's an uncontroversial notion in modern micro.  I think that the tax cannot be passed on because the market enforces it.  Put another way:

     

    Taxes on commodities are usually passed on to the consumer in higher prices. What is to stop landowners from doing the same thing? That is, can a landowner increase the rent charged to tenants so as to pay the land value tax and still collect the same net rent as before?

    Remember: land is not produced by labor. It is fixed in quantity and its price is a monopoly price (all the traffic will bear). A tax on labor products increases the cost of those products and this is reflected in the price. If the new price meets consumer resistance, the supply of that product is checked.

    But a tax on land does not affect either its cost of production (it is not produced) or its supply (which is fixed). Thus its price is not increased (for it is already all the traffic will bear), and the tax falls directly on the owner. The rent of land is determined by the margin of production and it is a certain amount whether taxed or untaxed. A tax on land is simply a division of the rent between the owner and the community.

    Now, if that doesn't sound right, you're probably thinking something like, "Okay, but if that's true then why don't we do that?"  Good question.

    You're right that taxes of most kinds (that is, taxes on competitive markets for normal goods) produce inefficiencies in the market.  That's what my first graph shows.  The second graph illustrates that a tax on a perfectly inelastic good, like land, can't shift the supply curve.  That is, if you'll observe the first graph again, where the inefficiency arises from.  Hopefully, this seems a bit more intuitive now.

    As for your last graph, one reason I appeal to the inefficiency of these taxes is because it's correct.  But here are some things we have in this country right now: record high unemployment, a severe need for some kind of fiscal stimulus and a hatred for taxes.  Well, modern supporters of George argue that his tax system, by reducing the inefficiencies (which might add up to $1T/yr in the US by some estimates I've seen), can, over time, deliver full employment.  So, I think the inefficiencies are important for two reasons: 1. They exist and actually do create a drag on production which is regressive because it is born primarily by working people and small business owners, not the rentiers and 2. Because it offers itself as a way to sell the policy in the current political climate.

    But don't get me wrong.  I think getting equity right is just as important.  I think there's an equally strong argument from social justice to tax the rentiers in order to achieve equity.

    When you mention trade-off between the disutility of inefficient taxes versus the utility of social spending, the modern supporters of George would say that this is the trade-off that we're always and offered, but we've been made to believe, over many decades, that it's the only choice.  That truly is the only trade-off if all you're willing to tax is production and consumption.  What George is proposing is different.  This is a simple way to conceptualize the difference.


    I'm sorry, but I think a lot of that Wikipedia stuff is a kind of idle quasi-moral and hairsplitting theorizing - written by advocates of various philosophies who saw fit to contribute to a Wikipedia page - that makes no practical difference to actual business behavior.   If the government sends a company a tax bill every years for $X, it doesn't matter whether the government calls the taxes a land tax, or a rent tax, or a property tax, or a capital tax or an income tax or a "we don't like you tax".   It's a tax, and is thus one of the costs the company incurs to keep itself in business.  The prices a company charges for its goods and services are always reflective of their total costs.  They don't care how some macroeconomist parses the costs into different theoretical buckets.

    I can't make much sense of the yellow highlighted passages.  There is an old classical, 19th century theory that the wage paid to labor is simply the marginal productivity of that labor.  But that is ridiculous.   The price paid for anything depends on such things as supply, demand and bargaining power.  If some workers become more productive, but they have no bargaining power in a high unemployment economy with disorganized labor, they will not be able to turn their added productivity into higher wages.  If a bunch of workers become less productive, on the other hand, but possess increasing bargaining power in an economy with full employment and strong unions, they will be able to demand higher wages despite their falling productivity.

    Similarly, what landowners will charge for the rental of their land depends on the market conditions for land use and what they can get away with charging.   If I own some land, or land+facilities, and a business rents it from me, then whether I can pass any additional taxes onto that business will depend on whether the business has any realistic option of moving elsewhere if the rent gets too high.   And of course if the business owns its own land and facilities, and finds its property taxes increase, they will make some calculation as to how much of the added cost they can recoup from their customers via higher prices and added revenues, and how much they have to eat themselves.  This is no different than any other factor that increases their costs.

    I suspect there is some kind of confusion here over the notion of the "supply of land".  The Georgian argument seems to be that since the supply of land is fixed, increased taxes on it will not alter its supply, and so will not add to the production costs of businesses that sit on land.   But what is "supplied" in this case is not land, but residency on the land.   If residing on some land is essential to some productive process, and if you increase the cost for some enterprise or household of residing on some land, then you increase their costs period.  Similarly, if some landowner's whole "output" is land residency services sold to others, and his whole cost of production is the cost of owning the land, and the government increases the cost of owning the land, then the landowner will attempt to recoup as much of those increased costs as possible from his customers.   He might not be able to do so, but the same is true if you add cost-increasing taxes anywhere else along the chain of production, as the Europeans do with VAT taxes for example.


    The Wikipedia article on economic rent doesn't say anything different than what is taught in contemporary economic textbooks from Berkeley to Harvard.  It's completely uncontroversial and modern, not something from a confused 19th century intellectual backwater.

    If I'm not mistaken, aren't you a Granite Stater?  AFAIK, New Hampshire still gets about two thirds of its revenue from property tax as opposed to income or sales tax.  It's the only state left to collect over half its revenue from property.  Your state would appear to be in much better economic shape than my state, which flushed property taxation down the toilet 30 years ago.

    The ensuing 30 years have not been good for us.  You might have caught a clip of some students being beaten with batons at UC Berkeley recently.  Or the students pepper sprayed at UC Davis.  Those students weren't just latching onto Occupy, they were engaged in a series of protests that's been going on at California public schools for years as tuition has skyrocketed.  Tuition on UC campuses is fully 200% of what it was just six years ago.  Yet Chancellors like Birgenau and Katehi just doubled their salaries again to $400k/yr, up from $200k/yr last year.  All this while tuition continues to climb, classes get canceled, etc.

    30 years ago those schools were essentially free.  30 years ago the real estate market in CA also used to look much more like the rest of the nation.  Now, it's the epicenter of the housing collapse.  When we had the property tax, we had the Master Plan that helped build what is arguably the greatest pubic research institution in the world.  But 30 years ago we capped the property tax at 1%.  We've been slowly eroding that system ever since.

    I think there's a good chance all of this is connected, but since you don't want to take my word for it, here's Joseph Stiglitz:

    The Generalized Henry George Principle:
    One of the general principles of taxation is that one should tax factors that are inelastic in supply, since there are no adverse supply side effects. Land does not disappear when it is taxed. Henry George, a great progressive of the late nineteenth century, argued, partly on this basis, for a land tax. It is ironic that rather than following this dictum, the United States has been doing just the opposite through its preferential treatment of capital gains.

    But it is not just land that faces a low elasticity of supply. It is the case for other depletable natural resources. Subsidies might encourage the early discovery of some resource, but it does not increase the supply of the resource; that is largely a matter of nature. That is why it also makes sense, from an efficiency point of view, to tax natural resource rents at as close to 100% as possible. The well-designed auctions described earlier enable government to capture most of the rents derived from government owned assets.


    I'm not arguing either for or against property taxes as a mechanism for raising revenues.  They are an endless source of controversy here in New Hampshire.   Some would like to replace some of these high property taxes with other kinds of taxes, including sales and income taxes.  Others want to leave the current system alone.  I have no strong feelings about the matter.   The question should be approached by attempting to measure the overall impacts of various tax systems on various classes of people and businesses.

    My only objection is what seems to me to be a dubious theoretical framework for thinking about taxes.  The question in the end really just comes down to who pays the tax, and how much they pay.   If some entity X is paying a tax, whether X is a household or a business, then it really doesn't matter what incomes sources the taxes are officially attached to.  All that matters is the amount of the tax.  Their income is reduced by the same amount either way; the effect on their behavior is the same either way.   The rest is just ideological window-dressing.

    The problem in California isn't that you gave up on property taxes specifically.  You could have replaced the property taxes with other taxes.   The problem is that you either started bringing in lower overall revenue per capita and making smaller overall spending commitments per capita - or else you decided to pull revenue away from universities to spend it on other needs.   The money is out there to get.   You just have to decide from whom you will get it, and in what quantities to get it.   The distribution of the tax burden makes an economic difference; but the ideological categories into which you divide up the taxes make no difference.

    You mentioned yourself that the chancellors of your universities doubled their salaries.   I imagine a great many other very affluent people also doubled or tripled or even quintupled their incomes as well.  Do you really think that socking those people with big income taxes that brings them back to close to where they were before will really add significant "inefficiencies" to the system?  Something happened in the world that dramatically raised the real values of the marginal products produced by university chancellors and others over just a few decades?   Or do you think these people just got better at applying political and institutional leverage, and exploiting power relations, to carve themselves greater pieces of the productive pie?

    Some people might like George because that approach advances some essentially socialistic ideas under a garb of property rights thinking, and some venerated 19th century all-American animadversions toward greedy feudalist landlords.   But the basic idea applied to industrial economies and more modern economies really isn't much different  than the socialist idea.   That basic idea is that some people derive income in ways that have nothing to to with any actual work they have performed in a productive process, or any value they have added to the productive output from that work in a productive process, but solely as a result of an ownership claim.   If I own some sharecropper's land, or some business's factories, then I have a legally established ability to force them to pay me money in order to work the land or operate the factory.  But the same is true if I own an equity stake in the factory, or in a large corporation that owns a whole bunch of factories and other productive factors.  In that broader sense, I am a "rentier" - a person deriving an income from stuff I own by sitting back and charging other people a fee for the right to employ what I own in some way, and doing so in such a way that the income I collect exceeds the value of what is consumed in the productive process.

    If they are still teaching in the economics books that the wage returned to labor - or some other factor of production - is equal to the marginal product created by that labor, well then that is just a really dumb theory that could only be defended by people who are lost in the curves and the pseudo "laws" that have been promulgated by dead economists, and have no idea how the world actually works.


     If some entity X is paying a tax, whether X is a household or a business, then it really doesn't matter what incomes sources the taxes are officially attached to.  All that matters is the amount of the tax.

    Dan, this is just wrong as far as I can see.  Maybe this will help.  If I go work all today and receive a wage of X, then I've probably done something valuable for someone else that was worth X.  Except, as I've shown above, if you now tax my labor you've done several destructive things.  You've reduced my surplus.  That raises the price of my labor, leaving  both me and whoever I'm selling my labor to with less.  It also will have the effect of reducing the overall supply of labor in the market - in other words, it will shift the supply curve, but I don't want to get lost in the curves here. ;)

    Now, there is literally no one I can think of that knows about economics, not even the most liberal economists, that deny this.  I've given you a bunch of examples of very alive, very published and in some cases very Nobel'd (in the case of Stiglitz and Vickrey w/r/t their work in this area) economists who will vindicate me on this.  You will get absolutely zero argument from conservative economists on this point.

    What about in my example where the landlord pays some or all of the ground rent to the government as tax?  Nothing happens in the market.  The supply of land doesn't increase or decrease because this rent is accruing to the community instead of a private party.  The demand for land does not increase or decrease.  No one is made worse off, save individual landlords - who are still perfectly able to profit from their capital investments.  Surplus is not reduced.  Deadweight loss does not occur.  All that has happened is that the ground rent is being received by the government.

    All this tax can do is eat into the unearned income of landlords.  It does not reduce surplus or factors of production.  How can a landlord respond to this?  They can't simply will an above market rent.

    No, the collection of the rent on natural resources by the community, the resources of which are supplied inelastically, is clearly different than taxes on other markets.

    FWIW, this is exactly what they're teaching these days.  While you may disagree, there is empirical evidence to support this.

    Of course, all economic models represent a simplified story of reality, but that's true of all scientific models.

    Philosophically, George splits the difference between your land rentier and your capital rentier by pointing out that capital is created by labor, but natural resources are not.  I will agree that his philosophical is a radical kick in the nuts to the Lockean perspective that we've based the last century on, but that hasn't exactly worked out on all fronts.

    Policy-wise, there is nothing radical about what George proposes.  It could be implemented quickly or slowly, locally or nationally and should deliver economic results at least as good as what we've had in the past, all while offering us a sensible framework for proper stewardship of the Earth.


    As I said, DF, I think there is some confusion here over the term "supply of land".   In economics, supply and demand are phenomena that relate specifically to markets.   The supply of X is not the same thing as the amount of X in existence.   The supply of X in some market is the amount of X for sale in the market.   You are assuming, I gather, that because the amount of land <i>in the world</i> is more or less fixed, land tax policies cannot affect the supply curve in the markets for the sale of land or markets for the rent of land.   Why should one believe this?

    I also don't understand why you don't think a landlord and property owner who attempts to pass on higher property taxes to his renters will not frequently succeed in doing this.   Don't give me an answer out of a textbook - just reason through the problem directly.   It seems to me that whether they can succeed of not depends on a whole host of highly contingent market conditions.  I think you are assuming that the conditions prior to the tax increase already represent some sort of efficient market equilibrium, and so the suppliers of land cannot increase price of land without reducing demand for land to such a level that that they lose more from disappearing renters than they gain from the higher rents collected from those who continue to rent.  But I tend to doubt this ever happens.  We are always in a very inefficient state of highly unstable and barely organized chaos in modern capitalist economies, dominated by massive uncertainty and imperfections and asymmetries of information flow.   Aggregate macroeconomic efficiency and stable equilibria occur mainly in textbook fantasy worlds.

    Most rentier behavior in the modern world doesn't involve just the owners of land or basic resources, but the owners of every kind of factor of production, who use their ownership power to extract the largest share they can from flows of revenue.  The amount of power they have is directly related to the amount that they own, and the degree to which they are successful in forming coalitions with common class interests to control, though political and market actions, the size of the income flows coming their way.  Class coalitions among similar actors play a larger role than competition between them.

    On the general point about taxes.  Consider this:

    You go to work and work 8 hours at $20 an hour.  That is the most hours your employer will permit per day.  At the end of the day the company paymaster hands you a stub saying that $160 has been directly deposited in your bank account.  You then go home and receive and email from the government, that says, "You have been assessed a standard 10% labor tax for your work today.  We have deducted $16 dollars from your bank account."   Do you have the option of reducing the tax by reducing your labor?  No, because no matter how much you reduce your labor, you lose more from the foregone pay than you lose from the tax.   As long as the tax is fixed at 10% of your income, it remains in your interest to work as many hours as you can.

    Now consider whether your economic behavior will be affected any differently if the email from the government says,

    "You have been assed a $16 cost of breathing tax for today's breathing.

    "You have been assessed a $16 daily land use fee for the land you walked on today.

    "You have been assessed a $16 daily military infrastructure user fee for the security benefits you receive from the US Marines.  Semper Fi."

    No not at all.  You economic behavior will be the same, no matter which tax is assessed.

    Now there certainly are some tax policies that will affect your behavior differently.  But the reason they affect your behavior differently is because they influence the amount of tax you are actually required to pay.   It has nothing inherently to do with the factor to which the tax is allegedly attached.

    You just have much more faith than I do that the economic world which would operate in the absence of taxes represents something at least passably close to to textbook models of competitive markets.  I see that world as a world of power relations, in which people pay the prices and receive the benefits those with power decide they should pay and receive.  And I believe that people who own the bulk of what is owned are not primarily competitors in a free market system, but rather cooperating participants in a hierarchical social system whose rulers are united by class interest in imposing the terms they desire on everybody else.  I regard almost everything I learned in my college intermediate macro and micro courses as ideological hogwash, which has very minimal applicability to the real world as I experience it in the business world and my everyday life.

    You seem to think I am opposed to some sort of "radicalism" in George's proposals.  I'm not.  I don't think he is radical enough.   My own view is that we should focus on taxing surplus wealth of all kinds - savings that are not being consumed or invested, and that are possessed by very affluent people for whom those savings represent very low marginal value.  By transferring that wealth to hungrier, less affluent people who will do something more useful with it, we increase its utility.   I think we should focus much more on questions of social utility and less on intuitions about property rights.  We should also give up the idea that economies without strong regulatory supervision and redistributive taxation are operating with some sort of efficiency .  A tax is just as likely to improve efficiency as destroy it.   For example, financial markets in the pre-2008 period weren't at all efficient.  They were a riot of flim-flam and Ponzi activity that perverted and destroyed the nation's economy.    That's what you get when you let people free to do what they want in financial markets.   A stiff transactions tax would not only gather a good deal of revenue for the public sector to spend on something useful.  It would also probably impose some needed discipline on financial markets.


    As I asked Genghis above, why should one believe that it moves the supply curve?  If the community or government collects the ground rent, or some portion thereof, no land is destroyed, so supply cannot diminish.  Likewise, how can supply increase?  As a landlord, can I increase my supply of land?  No, I cannot.

    Does it bend the curve to have a government or community stand in the place of a landlord? Again, why would it?  The slope of the curve represents the elasticity of supply in the market.  In other words, how willing is the market to supply more land at a given price.  This should, likewise, give some indication as to why the supply curve should be vertical.  How willing is the market to alter supply more land at a higher price?  It's completely unwilling because it can't.

    If you want to insist that the ground rent accruing to the community instead of a private landlord has some effect on the market, or specifically the supply curve, you need to tell me a story about how that happens.

    As for wider arrays of rentier behavior, I'm well aware of this stuff.  There's been plenty written about this, for example in the developing world by people like Jagdish Baghwati.  As for class coalitions, I very much like what Bill Domhoff from UCSC has written on the subject over the years.

    Any market with a monopoly supply will produce rents.  Like land.  The question is who has the rights to them?  Henry George says they have a right to the rental on capital, but not on land.  That's his philosophical claim.

    Your labor example appears wrong to me as well.  It doesn't seem account for opportunity cost, which is instrumental to the whole notion of economic rent in the first place.  If you start eating into my share of surplus, I start looking for more attractive options, like working under the table or stealing or even, eventually, just taking my time as leisure.  This is exactly why the source of income that a tax is attached to ​does​ matter - opportunity cost and substitution effects.

    Opportunity cost is another way to look at what George is saying.  The opportunity cost in the case of the landlord - not, say, a building superintendent - is nil.  It costs somebody absolutely nothing to own land and collect the ground rent.  Conversely, the same may not be true, and probably is not true, about a rental rate for capital.  If I spend my time building a machine instead of laboring for someone and I then rent that machine to someone in order to recover my costs, there is opportunity cost built into my labor to construct the machine.  That's just not true of collecting ground rent.

    I like your last two grafs a lot.  I am going to dedicate my next post to your second to last graf - namely whether or not markets are competitive, how we can know and why that matters to ordinary people.  I don't put faith into anything.  I look for evidence, so I want to share some of what I've seen to maybe evolve the discussion on that point.

    As for your last graf, I agree with you almost entirely about inefficiency in the financial markets, but I would want to be careful about two things here: 1. What, exactly, is the definition of efficiency at play and 2. How should we consider efficiency in a market that was fundamentally based on property and potentially bore some or all of the problems highlighted by George and others vis a vis property.

    Finally, even though I might find cause to agree with you about taxing the rich, one thing I've thought a lot about over the last several years is not only how to craft a progressive domestic policy, but also how to sell that policy to the general public.  One thing that I think George's philosophy has going for it is that it might actually appeal to Americans in the present day.  Simply taxing the rich because they're rich has been, it would seem, a harder sell as of late.


    Here are two ways it can affect the supply curve:

    1. Supply: New housing can be built. No, that's not new "property", but it's new value that is affected by taxation.
    2. Demand: Less housing can be used. After graduating from college, I shared a two-bedroom apartment with 3 other guys (there were a total of four of us). Multi-family cohabitation is not unheard of.

    I agree that the supply/demand equation is different than for typical goods, but supply and demand do still apply.


    How does #1 actually shift​ the supply curve for land?  Housing is not land.  In George's model, housing is capital.

    Again, demand for housing is not synonymous with demand for land​.  Even if demand moves, how does that affect the supply curve?

    You agree that supply and demand are different for land than for typical goods.  How, exactly, do you perceive them to be different?  My claim, and the claim of George, Gaffney, Stiglitz, et alia, is that the supply of land is inelastic.  How, specifically, is it different in your view?


    I suppose I'm misunderstanding George's point. Separating the value of land from the value of the housing on the land seems like it would be difficult in practice. Land in dense urban areas is worth more precisely because it is dense with people (which requires housing). Without the housing, it wouldn't be dense. This is well outside my area of expertise, so perhaps I'm missing something.

    As for the supply of land being inelastic, it is very nearly so. If we're talking land and not housing, however, then demand is much more elastic, which might be a point being made somewhere that went over my head. It would encourage denser population areas, which I suspect you would be a fan of, as those tend to be more energy efficient.

    If you could help me understand both of those two paragraphs above, I'd appreciate it. Please understand that I'm questioning you more from a lack of understanding than from a position of thinking you're wrong.


    It might seem difficult, but it's not really.  My house, and all the houses in my neighborhood, have land values separated from the building value.  Since I'm shopping for a new home right now, I see these values listed for every property out there.  And it's done just like for houses: you look at what market values for similar plots have been recently.

    Yes, there are projects to create additional land, but that's a completely trivial concern - though it could be very interesting in the future.  The demand curve is not held to be inelastic, which is why it slopes down in the graph.  However, as long as it has some slope between 1 and 0, the effects of inelastic land supply will still hold.  And your thinking about land-use density seems correct to me.  Indeed, supporters of George's proposal hold that it would encourage more efficient land usage.

    I'm doing my best to try to field all the questions here to the best of my knowledge and am happy to continue to do so.  I fully expected, and even desired, a barrage of such questions.

    No such thing as a stupid question.  Or at least that's what I'm told!


    I actually just bought a new house myself (back in May), and I know just how expensive our tiny plot of land was. The reason my land costs this much, however, is because of what is built on nearby properties (as well as other factors, of course). This makes me think that while the supply of land is inelastic (for all intents and purposes), its value most definitely is not. Furthermore, what my neighbors build affect the value of my land, which would seem to lead to the problem of gentrification. Granted, we already have these problems with ordinary property taxes. I suppose this is all taken into account in George's proposal. I'm just not getting it. This doesn't imply it's wrong, just that I"m not understanding it. I feel like many other smart people here are also struggling with it, and I think that dagblog has a smarter-than-average audience, so I do think that makes this a difficult sell. Of course, selling things doesn't always require the "buyer" to understand it, I suppose. wink


    DF, I was formulating a response above but this comment helped me focus on the objection: "It costs somebody absolutely nothing to own land and collect the ground rent."

    In an absolute sense, you are correct. But there are two complicating factors. 1) Land is almost always purchased on credit, so in practice, it does cost money to own land. If you raise the land tax high enough, landlords would have to raise rents in order to simply pay interest costs. 2) Utilizing land costs money, so even a landowner with no mortgage might be forced to raise rents or sell.

    Consider it from the point of view of an ordinary middle-class co-op owner who already has high maintenance and mortgage costs. If the new land taxes outpaced income tax reductions, such owners would be forced to sell. Similarly, any commercial landowners operating close to margin would have to either raise rents or sell. The result would likely be a massive sell-off.

    The whole system would have re-equilibrate at much lower real estate values for the middle class to afford land and for commercial owners to meet costs without raising rents. Leaving aside the interim damage (I'm picturing abandoned lots reminiscent of the 80s), the lower land values would reduce the tax base that you just created.


    G, I think I see your misunderstanding.  These aren't "new land taxes."  It's the ground rent, either in whole or in part, accruing to the community and/or state instead of to a private party.

    If the ground rent portion of what a landlord collects on, say, an apartment building is now to be paid to the government instead of pocketed, and that phases in everywhere at once, then how does the individual landlord respond?  Even if your story is accurate, how do I, as an individual, respond to this in a market sense?  I can't just suddenly demand more rent than the market will bear.

    Furthermore, I'm now not paying taxes on the capital portion of my holding, nor on my income.  Even if those things don't net me a gain, what am I to do about the loss of the ground rent?  I can't raise rent.  I could sell, but to whom?  Every other property looks the same to the buyer.

    This is what it means for the supply to be inelastic.  The market will choose what I can rent a particular piece of housing for.  I think you might be committing the fallacy of composition in this analysis.

    And yes, over time, there would probably be a new nominal equilibrium price for land, but how is that necessarily a bad thing?  Prices move over time.


    So a private homeowner does not pay any land tax/ground rent?

    Nonetheless, my point about landlords still holds. First, few landlords buy with cash. They factor in the cost of capital, the maintenance costs, and the expected rents. And it's my sense that most recently purchased properties operate close to margin, since the buy price reflects the expected return.

    Second, I assume that most landlords would face a net loss of income under the proposal. Otherwise, what's the point of the change if it doesn't readjust the tax burden?

    That means that the loss of income from rents would render many properties unprofitable.

    In that case, landlords would either have to a) raise rents, b) sell the properties, or if neither option is tenable, c) abandon the properties.

    Or to put it another way, if rents, the cost of capital, and maintenance costs remain fixed as revenue declines, the only variable that can be adjusted is the real estate value. So after a mass sell-off / walk-off, you eventually reach a new equilibrium with much lower real estate prices to account for the lower expected returns. That might be OK (ignoring the interim trauma), but it will also reduce the tax base.


    I would add that if you exclude private residences, I don't think that you can make much of an impact on tax distribution. The nation's Trumps don't have that much money relative to the size of the economy.


    Hey DF, some good news about US land ownership!

    The largest landowner in the U.S. is the federal government, with 760 million acres (31.4% of the country).

    The largest private landholder is Ted Turner, who owns 1.8 million acres and could possibly be reasoned with.

    The largest corporate landowner is the Plum Creek Corporation, which owns 7.3 million acres.  It's a publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trust with a $6 billion market cap, so it will take us awhile to acquire it and bend it to our will, but they will have to pay us a 4% dividend for the privilege.  They, and other REITS would be our biggest enemies here because -- REITS pay no corporate income taxes if they distribute 90% of their profits to shareholders.  So they would probably not want to pay taxes on the land they own.

    This all comes from a book called "Who Owns The World," which is interesting wealth porn.

     


    Thanks, destor.  The first statistic is interesting and relates to a point that I made above to Trope, which is that thinking about this as a nationalization of land isn't correct because, particularly in the sovereign sense, the US government owns its territory.  So, George's tax doesn't nationalize land any more than it already is.

    Furthermore, think about that 30% or so.  A lot of that represents national parks and otherwise conserved land.  Most people agree that's a good thing.  But what on Earth gives the US government the right to hold all that land?  It's really the same thing that George is talking about in ​Progress and Poverty​.  We already acknowledge in practical, legally codified ways that these things are held in common.  It's just that we currently let entities like REITs pocket the rent.


    I don't see it as a nationalization of land, but as you pointed out it will be painted that way, which is kind of the point I was trying to make (and did not do a good job). The questions that derive from this view would be things that would need to be addressed to put people's minds at ease.  The moment one says the government owns the land (it is difficult to say it is held "in common") is the moment someone will say that the government will tell you whether or not you can put in swimming pool.  Through zoning laws, environmental regulation, etc these things are already done, but the notion that it is the individual's property not the government.  Even more so would be the claim that since it is government's land, not one's own personal property, agents of the government don't need a reason to come onto one's property.  We are talking about financial interests who have no problem spreading falsehoods.

    We already acknowledge in practical, legally codified ways that these things are held in common.

    To the extent that is true, it smacks up against the 5th Amendment. If things are held in common, why does the government have to provide just compensation for land when they take it by declaring imminent domain? Moreover, if land is held in common, what does the Fifth Amendment mean by private property?  How can something be private and public at the same time?


    I don't disagree with you one bit that reforms will be resisted, but that's true of literally any reform proposal that actually has the chance to change the status quo.  Any such proposal will be called anything and everything: communist, fascist, heretical, etc.  On that note, what interests me is not what might be said against it so much as what can be said in support of it.

    I'm really not sure how this becomes a 5th Amendment issue.  Property tax was the primary source of revenue for most of the nation well into the 1920s.  New Hampshire gets about two thirds of its state revenue from property versus other sources.  Is New Hampshire violating the 5th Amendment?


    The whole 5th Amendment issue has to do with how it is explained.  On one hand it seems what is being proposed is that simply all other taxation is removed and governments seek their revenue solely through property taxes.

    On the other hand, the proposal is framed with a move to claim that all property is held in common, and therefore no one can claim that they own their property.

    It is a matter of semantics.  Even though people (or at least most people) recognize the government's right to impose regulations and zoning laws, etc., thereby limiting what a person can and cannot do with their land, the understanding by many is the government is able to impose these limits on people to utilize their private property as they see fit because of the impact on the larger community of people.  Not because the government (i.e. the people) own the land and thus can tell who ever is on the land what they can and cannot do.

    The government from this view is more like a home owners association and the various property owners have entered into a collective agreement which limits their freedom in the name of the greater good.  The way you are framing it, the government is the landlord and the property owners merely renters who at the mercy of the landlord and whatever wishes and demands the landlord may dream up.  Or so some perceive it.

    The Fifth Amendment clearly states there such a thing a private property, which the government cannot seize without compensating the owner.  Many perceive this as stating in their minds that the individual own the land (thus making it private) and thereby making no longer public land.


    Well, I'm not sure who perceives it that way.  There's nothing at all in this to imply that the government has any more or less purview than it currently does.  Policy-wise, it's just shifting the tax base to real property.  That's been done over and over at every level of government in America.  That part should be completely uncontroversial, particularly as a matter of law.


    You start off the discussion in your blog:

    Henry George argued that land, and essentially all natural resources, belong to all people collectively.

    This can easily be construed by people as saying that all land is owned by the people. If all you want to do is shift the tax base to real property, then all of this discourse about the people owning the land is completely unnecessary and from a marketing point of view a disaster. 

    Try talking to a libertarian or someone with libertarian leanings about the the people collectively owning all land and resources and see what kind of response you get.  Talk to any rancher or farmer about how the people own their land and see what kind of response you get.  And just wait until the various PACs etc start talking about how those liberals and Democrats want to collectivize all land and resources, and see what kind of response you get.

    It is pure Americana to seek to own one's own little plot of land.  You talk to them and they will say that they own this land. That it is theirs and no one else's. 

    And fundamentally it is because they own it, not the government and not the people, that if the government wants the land they have to compensate people for it.


    I understand what you're saying about those perceptions.  I know plenty libertarians and various other hardcore conservatives and I've tried these ideas out on a few them.

    I understand that the underpinning philosophy, that every natural is held in common, seems radical.  However, I don't think there's actually anything radical about it as a policy.  Those same libertarians very much like the idea of hearing about lifting taxes from incomes and capital.

    I would love to believe that the philosophy was saleable, but I don't think that's as important as having a policy to go with.  The Democrats have jack nothing.  Who actually has a domestic policy prescription that might work?  There's nothing on offer.

    I don't hold out much hope in turning modern day Americans into a bunch of latter-day Henry Georges.  I do, however, think that there's an opportunity here to whip their heads around on the tax issue.  Why?  Taxes have steadily shifted off of property and onto income and sales taxes, both of which are regressive in this country presently.

    What if, in the toxic environment we presently find ourselves, there was a cohesive progressive movement that suddenly starting calling for untaxing "the people" and taxing the Trumps?  That's a hell of a lot sweeter than what the Dems have on offer right now.  I bet you could peel of more than just bit of confused Tea with a platform like that.

    As far as your insistence that the land is just theirs and that's it, we both know that's not true.  I am technically a "land owner," but as anyone in this situation can tell you, I do not own this land in the sovereign sense, which is the sense that you describe.  I cannot do whatever I want with it.  I cannot dig massively into the Earth or build a skyscraper.  Where I live, I can't play loud music after 10PM.  I can't even own a fucking chicken!  How's that for me owning the owny hell out of what I own and not the onerous government?

    The point here is that while the perception you describe may be pervasive, I think it's only detrimental to selling the philosophy, not the policy.  The policy is just a shift of taxes from incomes, primarily, to natural resources.  As for the PACs, they will say that stuff anyway.  How successful have the Dems been in selling their muddled, tehcnocratic mess of an economic policy in the face of that sort of bile?

    The right will say what it wants.  How will we answer back?  Do we actually have a plan that works?  Does anyone, even the mode ardent Dem, truly believe that the Democrats, or anyone else, truly has a cohesive domestic policy agenda that works at this point?


    I'm with you basically on a policy front.  And I realize you are blogging here and not red state.  But in terms of framing, I would say one would want to drop the philosophy and present is simply as something that make good economic sense, with the tag line that it is going after the Trumps and not the hard working class.  The philosophy just opens it up to needless attacks.  We deal in a sound bite world.  Unfortunate but true. 

    As far as this goes:

    I am technically a "land owner," but as anyone in this situation can tell you, I do not own this land in the sovereign sense, which is the sense that you describe.  I cannot do whatever I want with it.  I cannot dig massively into the Earth or build a skyscraper.  Where I live, I can't play loud music after 10PM.  I can't even own a fucking chicken!  How's that for me owning the owny hell out of what I own and not the onerous government?

    I agree with you, but as the scenario with the wetlands I described in my blog on this matter, the acceptance of limits is not absolute.  While if asked outright, most people would not say they are the sovereign owner of the land, they do respond to government intrusion as something which needs to be weighed on its merits.  If they believe it stepping over a line, they will resist.  And given the reaction of some of those land owners over the GMA regulations, they saw themselves as ultimately the sovereign owners, right down to getting out their guns to protect what is theirs.  It is within this view that one can also the justification for shooting and killing any intruders on the property they believe intend to do harm.  One foot off their property, no. Step one foot onto my property, yes.


    The implication here is that since land belongs to all of us equally, that the ground rent is owed to the community.

    This is a particularly loaded sentence.  In this you plainly use the word "rent" along with the idea that land belongs to all of us equally.  When one discussing to a specific land owner, they do not believe that any one else, let alone everybody in the country equally owns their property. 

    Like I said, this is semantics on some level.  But a fundamental notion in this country (as elsewhere) is that once I buy a piece of land, it is mine. It belongs to no one else but me.  To use phraseology that implies otherwise, when all you want to do is shift the tax base, is counterproductive.


    Your insistence on a particular notion of ownership aside, it's really only relevant if one is invested in selling the fundamental philosophy.  In that sense, it's entirely semantic.

    But, as I contend above, I don't think you necessarily have to sell the philosophy in order to sell the policy.  Again, explore all the very real ways that I've outlined above in which the land that I own is not mine to do whatever I wish with.  I think that you might be underestimating the extent to which people have an intuitive sense that this is true.


    I think my insistence in part comes from recently immersing myself in this issue in order to write the blog I did, along with my personal experiences with private rights movement.  I guess my point is that the notion of selling the philosophy should be put aside for the time being if your goal is to sell the policy in the short-term (a worthy endeavor in my opinion).

    I suppose while they might have an intuitive sense that they do not really own the land, they have just a powerful sense of what is they believe the way things ought to be.  The reality may be the government (as opposed to the "people'') may be able to dictate to them what can and cannot do, but deep down they believe this a result of the intrusive stepping over the line.  Not all people obviously.  But within the segment of the population that makes up the conservative side of the field, this is very prevalent. IMHO. 


    I have a "friend" on FB who goes by the name "Henry George" and is, as you might expect a huge proponent of it. I promised I'd read Progress and Poverty, but haven't yet. The idea of making land--God's gift to us, if we can say it that way--common property is compelling. But the idea of making land the central or only true store of value seems a bit arbitrary. Why only land?

    But I do believe the teleos for the Georgist argument is that a land-based system of taxation as George laid out would generate enough income to eliminate poverty. That's what's magic about land. I think that's the claim that needs to examined, not whether there are other things we could or should tax.

    Put another way, it's not about the land.

    If we followed George's principles, we wouldn't have to tax anything else (I think).


    AFAIK, you're right about George's claims.  He did believe that his policies would help eliminate poverty.  That was the whole impetus for him writing on the subject in the first place.  He wanted to understand why, as society seemed to become richer, there appeared to be more poverty, not less.

    And the Henry George Theorem would seem to support, using modern economic tools, that George may have been spot on.