The Bishop and the Butterfly: Murder, Politics, and the End of the Jazz Age
    Doctor Cleveland's picture

    What Pakistan Knows

    Since Pakistan's recent double embarrassment in the Osama bin Laden affair, in which they proved unable to detect either bin Ladin living half a mile from their chief military academy or an American helicopter raid deep in the Pakistani interior (i.e. half a mile from their military academy), angry American legislators have been asking What Pakistan Knew about OBL's presence in their country.

    Let me try to reframe that question with another one:

    Does the President of Pakistan know who had his wife killed?


    I'm a long way from being an expert on Pakistan. But I do remember some very basic things. The current President, Asif Ali Zardari, came to power as the widower of his far more charismatic wife, Benazir Bhutto. Zardari is a proxy President for Bhutto's voters, a tender of the slain hero's legacy. He is Mr. Bhutto, basically a corrupt male version of Coretta Scott King. (Zardari's love of graft helped drive Bhutto from power, and even into exile, at various points of her career. His actual nickname is not "Mr. Bhutto" but "Mister Ten Percent," for the kickbacks he demanded while his wife was in power.)

    Benazir Bhutto is not President of Pakistan because she was murdered in public. And before she was murdered, she accused the regime at the time, including specific members of the regime, of scheming to have her assassinated. Then they pulled some of her security, and she was murdered while out on campaign. But in the end, the military regime had to accept elections and Bhutto's party, the PPP, which meant that her widower had to keep the flame alive as President.

    Does Ali Asif Zardari know exactly which members of the regime colluded in his wife's murder? Does he know which conspirators are still part of Pakistan's security establishment? If he does, he can't do a thing about it.

    The military regime had to give way to civilian leadership, but there was no clean-up of the Army or the ISI. The people who'd done Musharraf's dirty work didn't leave, let alone get punished. They're still there. And if the President of Pakistan wants to know who gave the orders that widowed him, he either can't find out or can't do anything about it. Think for a second what that means about how power is distributed in Pakistan, and how much control the official government has over the Army and the ISI.

    Pakistan does not seem, from my distant layman's perspective, to be have a fully accountable chain of command. Clearly, there are groups in the military and intelligence apparatus who conspire and freelance and simply don't let the higher-ups into the loop, and those people are wired to enough factional influence that they cannot easily be brought to heel. Some people have sufficient resources to assist al-Qaeda or the Taliban, or to conspire in other ways, and they do. Those people don't let their superiors know, and their superiors either can't find out or are afraid of the consequences if they do. Imagine a situation where Iran-Contra happened and Reagan actually didn't know about it, where some lieutenant colonel felt free to put that together without letting the President or his people know. That's what we're talking about.

    The people who hid bin Laden didn't tell Zardari, or anyone near Zardari, for the same reason they don't tell Zardari that they had his wife shot. They don't consider it his business.

    Is this appalling? You bet. How do you deal with a country where the military and the spooks aren't accountable to the official leadership? I don't know. But not dealing with Pakistan isn't an option. And putting the hammer down on the official leadership, the people being kept out of the loop by the entrenched military conspirators, is not going to help. All that will do is weaken the civilians and give them even less control over their insubordinate military. The military and intelligence hierarchies have always planned to outwait and outlast their nominal masters in the civilian leadership. There's no reason to speed up We're stuck with the same crappy deal that Zardari is; he became President without having full control over his army, because that was better than having no control over them at all. And now we're in the same boat. We could refuse to deal with Zardari, or his successors, because they don't have the power to hold up their side of their bargains, but all we'd be doing is sacrificing whatever control of the Pakistani military that the civilians do have.

    And before we start kicking Pakistan for being all Eastern and barbaric, remember that the West colludes in Pakistan's distribution of power. After the bin Laden raid, I saw one of the players that Bhutto accused of wanting her dead quoted in the New York Times: just another knowledgeable source.

    Comments

    It may be Zardari has no power at all, and he knows that if he tried to exert 'civilian control' he would be a dead man. The recent incident where the Muslim Pakistani Punjab governor had an entire clip emptied into him by one 'security' guard while the rest of the security guards did nothing, waiting apparently for the guy to finish shooting, and all because the dead man spoke out against killing Christians for 'blasphemy' must have acted as somewhat of a restraint on any reform coming from civilian officials in Pak.

    Pakistan might be described as a failed state almost from the day it was formed by Lord Mountbatten. Letting India deal with them might be the best policy, we should get out of the region, we've been there at war for 10 years for heavens sake, while Pak plays both sides, with perpetual war being the gift that keeps on giving for Pak.


    An excellent question, DC., and right on point, I think.


    Pakistan is running low on energy and water, and oil-generated electricity is often turned off for 18 - 20 hours per day. Their once promising textile export business suffers from the outages, and farming of course suffers from water shortages.

    Saudi Arabia has been forgiving Pakistan's oil import bill for several years now, so I expect that the KSA has a fair amount of influence in Pakistani affairs as well.


    Doc, I think that you've got the wrong guy. Sure, Zardari doesn't have much control of the military, but the U.S. doesn't necessarily deal directly with him on military matters anyway.

    But what about General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief? He used to be the director of the ISI. What about Lieutenant-General Ahmad Pasha, the current director of the ISI? Are they similarly clueless about what their subordinates are up to?


    I don't know. I don't know who knows what.

    But I don't believe that the Pakistan security appartus works like the American security apparatus does. I am not confident that there is full disclosure up the chain of command. (Would Kayani and Pasha have hidden bin Laden there?)

    I think we may be talking about a certain degree of institutionalized insubordination, where things don't get reported to direct superiors, and where some elements of the security forces do end runs around their supervisors and count on other powerful allies to cover for them.


    The ISI is very decentralized and compartmentalized, and I suspect the high command prefers it that way. Plausible deniability when things go wrong or get exposed -- the OBL raid, the Mumbai massacre, aid to the Taliban. I haven't a clue how much Kayani and Pasha really know. But as you say, doctor, certainly far more than Zardari does. 


    The question is what extent that insubordination is tolerated. Do Pasha and Kayani have a don't-ask-don't-tell policy with regard to their subordinates' activities? That would imply at least tacit permission to engage in operations like sheltering Bin Laden.

    Or do they literally have no control over their subordinates. We're not talking about minor abuses of power here. Bin Laden is not some agent's corrupt brother-in-law. If someone within ISI was hiding him in contradiction to the orders from the chief, that's a big deal. As was the killing of Bhutto.


    Or to flip it around, the question is how much control Pasha and Kayani have over their subordinates themselves. Pasha and Kayani are beholding to other power brokers inside (and outside) the organizations they head. The question isn't always whether they want to discipline a subordinate; sometimes the question is whether they can afford to discipline that subordinate, and how much.

    Pasha and Kayani are politicians, too. Their constituency is the other power players in their agencies, whose backing or consent they need to hold on to their positions, let alone to get anything done.  (Every general is chosen through a political process; in our system, the final say goes to politicians outside the military. In military dictatorships, the internal military politics is the main game.) If some of the people going behind their backs are protected by big fish, or are the big fish themselves, Pasha and Kayani are going to have to compromise. Remember, we're talking about a political culture that revolves around favors and connections, and one where graft . So maybe you can't fire or punish this or that subordinate without getting his Uncle Hamid's okay.

    And, most importantly, there's not a lot of budget accountability, so it must be very easy to fund black ops without your bosses knowing. It's already a country where it's assumed that nobody's looking at the budget figures too hard, because everyone accepts that some of the budget goes in your own pockets. Combine that with the secrecy and compartmentalization of an intelligence budget, and it's pretty easy to fund the Mumbai attacks or a safe house in Abbottabad. Put it this way: lots of Army and ISI types have built themselves nice houses in Abbottabad using money officially budgeted for something else. It would be pretty easy to build one for OBL. 


    All Pasha and Kayani need is 'plausible deniability' relating to any or all terror related persons, attacks, assassinations or incidents. Whether it be the massacre of aid workers form India in Kabul, the Mumbai attack, cross border Taliban terrorists residing in Pak, or the OBL mansion in Abbottabad, the top men will always claim non-involvement.

    I find it amusing that both you and Genghis seem to believe that Pasha and Kayani are squeaky clean fellows who just have a few bad apples operating under them, and that better accounting might have prevented the above incidents.


    Actually, I never said that Pasha and Kayani were boy scouts, or that accounting is the only problem. It's certainly not a few bad apples.

    My intent is to point out how difficult it is to bring either the Army or the ISI to heel. You can't simply replace Pasha or Kayani. They would only be replaced by similar people with exactly the same problems. And there's no solving it by getting rid of a few insubordinates. The whole system is insubordinate. It's not as easy as replacing the chiefs, or having the chiefs instill priper discipline. Instilling proper discipline, whoever the chief is, is likely impossible.


    It's not quite OT, Doc, but you may be interested in this news item about China giving fighter jets to Pakistan; a bit of a game-changer over 'bad blood'.