The US agreement with Poland on missile interceptors that Rice is going to sign seems particularly ill-timed.  It accomplishes the worst of both worlds--it is clearly a provocation to the Russians.  But it does nothing to address the current situation in the Caucasus.  

If Russia, this time, withdraws from its current position, where will it stop?  

Will troops remain in South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia?  If so, what then from the US and from the West? 

Over the weekend Bush has already, with his likely usual degree of effectiveness, told the Russians to get out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  That seems to me the sort of public remark that probably was--and should not have been--offered without anything like the sort of careful, thought-through answers to the "what next" questions this Administration is notorious for not engaging in.

Georgia's actions in South Ossetia--and it pains me to say this as someone who knows and counts as friends quite a few Georgians as a result of our stay there last year--should cause a reconsideration of whether it is a good idea for NATO to let Georgia into the alliance in accordance with the current accession timelines.

Saakashvili is reckless.  He is a hothead.  In his passion for reclaiming Abhkazia and South Ossetia he is very much reflecting the passions of the people he represents.  There is a good morsel of illusion that is tied up with Georgian national pride when it comes to Abkhazia.

I don't think it is just fine for Russia to take these territories by force.  What leverage does the West have with Russia that it is prepared to use in the cause of getting the Russians out of Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia?  So far it has been confronting tanks with words and we know how that can go.  I have yet to see even an unrealistic, let alone a realistic, plan or even idea for how Georgia might be able to bring Abkhazia into its orbit, even as a semi-autonomous territory. 

The Georgian government has no influence there over the day-to-day affairs of its people, and has not had any for many years now.  The people living in Abkhazia now overwhelmingly do not want to become a part of the rest of Georgia.  It is difficult to see why they would want to and how or why that might change any time soon.  The real question is what degree of autonomy will the people living there now have vis-a-vis the Russians going forward, it seems to me.  

South Ossetia is more complicated because of its far greater proximity to Tbilisi.  The current locus of criminality, drug and terrorist transit in and through Ossetia--<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/opinion/16bronner.html?ex=1219550400&e...">reported on by Michael Bronner in the August 15 NYT</a>--also needs to be factored into that situation. 

To the extent the US and the West believe that Georgian accession to NATO would permit ultra-nationalist Georgian leaders like Saakasvhvili to try to use the West as part of its Abkhazia fantasy and South Ossetia aspirations, NATO should think long and hard before leaving itself susceptible to such a possibility. 

Letting Georgia into NATO entails a defensive military commitment should the former be attacked.  For those who have no pro-Russian or pro-Georgian bias it is exceedingly difficult in many of these border flareups with the Russians over the past 15 years to determine which side instigated many of these various attacks.  Georgia, if part of NATO, can be expected to play up Russia's, and play down its own, responsibility for future border flareups, which strike me as likely, no matter where the Russian withdrawal stops.

Abkhazia is a distraction for Georgia now.  It is effectively gone.  It is very much in Georgia's interests for it to move on and focus on the many things it needs to do to continue building its society.  The people I know who were in Georgia in the 1990s and were back last year say the country, for all its challenges and problems, has made enormous strides forward in many areas, in infrastructure improvements and much-reduced levels of governmental corruption, for example. 

It's just as convenient for Georgian politicians to play the nationalist card vis-a-vis the Russians in Abkhazia as it is for politicians in any republic whose people are frustrated with the too-slow pace of positive change.  That doesn't mean it serves Georgia well at this point.  And certainly the West should not let itself get pulled into fighting that lost cause, or facilitating or enabling Georgian-initiated confrontation with the Russians.   

As I said, South Ossetia is a different and, it seems to me, a more complicated matter for both the Georgians and the West.

UIAMS.  Obviously the situation is highly fluid.  As I write, there are early reports that Russia is beginning to withdraw, as it said it would do beginning today.  We'll see.