And I saw another mighty angel come down from heaven, clothed with a cloud, and a rainbow upon his head, and his face as it were the sun, and his feet as pillars of fire
— Revelation 10:1


Nightfall

One autumn evening, when the air is brisk and the crescent moon opposes the last dim twilight, we may watch the world end. If the flash does not blind us, we may see the cloud boiling skyward, the colors of the visible spectrum racing through its halo, glaring like noonday as it rises up astride a column of civilization's embers.

Such a fearfully bright nightfall has been imagined since before Biblical times and re-imagined again in a thousand works of science fiction. That vision of the future haunts us because we realize it is actually within the realm of possibility. And unfortunately, it is more possible today than at any time in nearly two decades. As American power and influence fade, the specter gathers form. Eliot was wrong when he predicted: "This is how the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper." Actually, they may go together, with the whimper first. Then, if we are unwise, the bang.

Bush administration policies have reduced America's options for influencing world events. Militarily, diplomatically and economically, we have fewer tools in the box, and most of those tools are rusted or worn. As our choices vanish, we rely more on the options still left. That includes more reliance on the worst option of all: our nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, such increasing reliance makes America less safe. What's worse, it actually encourages circumstances more favorable for touching off a full-scale nuclear war.

In eight years of belligerent overconfidence, the Bush administration has led America down a blind alley. Surrounded by international crises, our basic choices may soon amount to handing over our wallet or trying to shoot our way out of trouble. That emerging dilemma is America's fundamental predicament in foreign policy and national security.

Deeply misunderstanding this, John McCain advocates the very policies that even the Bush administration began abandoning last year — policies that would continue backing our national security into a corner. McCain's plans would risk depriving the next commander-in-chief of all options other than the stark choices of committing to additional costly wars or surrendering our interests. McCain seems to have learned nothing from history, especially the last eight years of it.

The Bidding War for Victory

Most U.S. combat-ready troops are diverted in Iraq, while our reserve capability and equipment are as decrepit as our economy. Although we still can project substantial air and naval power, these are useful mostly for bombardment and cannot, by themselves, hold ground or compel adversaries to acquiesce. And now the West faces growing threats. Al Qaeda regroups in Pakistan. The Taliban surges in Afghanistan. Iran defiantly builds up its nuclear program. Russia ravages Georgia and threatens to strike Poland. North Korea threatens to abandon an agreement whose ink hasn't dried.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars account for $170 billion of this year's U.S. defense budget, helping to more than double defense spending in the past seven years, from $333 billion in 2001 to $696 billion in 2008. Even that figure does not include $40 billion for the Department of Homeland Security, $90 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs or $38 billion for diplomacy and foreign aid, all of which are costs directly related to national security. Yet all those dollars combined have not purchased our safety. In fact, the rate of increase in our defense spending pales compared to the accelerated spending of

The widely respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported in June that world military spending increased by 45 percent in the 10 years from 1998-2007. As the report notes, Russia is increasing its military spending at more than twice the rate of our Western European allies:

The subregion with the highest increase in military expenditure over the 10-year period 1998–2007 was Eastern Europe, at 162 per cent. It was also the region with the highest increase in 2007, at 15 per cent. Russia, with a 13 per cent increase in 2007, accounted for 86 per cent of this regional increase. Other subregions with 10-year growth rates exceeding 50 per cent are North America (65 per cent), the Middle East (62 per cent), South Asia (57 per cent), Africa and East Asia (both 51 per cent). The subregions with the lowest growth in military spending over the past 10 years were Western Europe (6 per cent) and Central America (14 per cent).

In short, at the very time our challenges are multiplying, the "big stick" of American influence is shrinking, especially relative to Russian influence and defense spending. We could rely more on the armed forces of our European allies, but relations between NATO countries remain frayed by lack of American leadership and European squabbling over national interests vs NATO interests. In addition, European economies are suffering and the armed forces of our allies generally have not kept up with their security needs. It's clear that any new U.S. military involvements will either cost far more or produce far less victory than we might like.

Diplomatic and Economic Shambles

Nor can we count on our diplomacy to rally the world as it once did. The Bush administration has all but destroyed the sway of our diplomats. The State Department is on speaking terms with too few world leaders. Bush has belittled and badgered our best allies with his ultimatum of "You're either with us or you're with the terrorists." He has ignored international bodies and agreements of every kind, from the United Nations to the Kyoto Accords, from the World Court to the Geneva Conventions. Even our remaining friends are reluctant to follow our lead. As a result, our ability to counter threats through peaceful, cooperative means now lies in shambles.

Richard Holbrooke, a former ambassador to the U.N. and the chief architect of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that the next president will face a daunting agenda:

To restore the United States to its proper world leadership role, two areas of weakness must be repaired: the domestic economy and the United States' reputation in the world. Although the economy is usually treated as a domestic issue, reviving it is as important to the nation's long-term security as is keeping U.S. military strength unchallengeable. This will require more than a cyclical upturn; to repair the economy in the long term, a new national policy on energy and climate change will be essential. And restoring respect for American values and leadership is essential -- not because it is nice to be popular but because respect is a precondition for legitimate leadership and enduring influence.

The Real Nuclear Option

Because our conventional military is hemorrhaging, our economy is wounded and our diplomacy is crippled, we retain only one credible deterrent against our most formidable foes. That deterrent is our nuclear arsenal, an instrument so blunt it makes our air and naval forces seem like engraved invitations to tea. As most of the world understands, a nuclear arsenal is no advantage at all against a nuclear adversary. It would be foolhardy to launch even a single nuclear missile without expecting retaliation in kind. Such is the great paradox of nuclear arms: They can only defend if they are never used.

Three laws apply: To the extent our diplomacy fails and our conventional forces provide no credible backup to our rhetoric, we encourage aggression and lose peaceful options for containing conflicts. To the extent our conventional forces cannot respond, we lose military options for repelling aggression and defeating belligerents. To the extent we rely on nuclear weapons to threaten our foes, we can neither use such weapons nor provoke others to use them.

But, in fact, we are provoking formidable adversaries. Some, like Russia, are nuclear. NATO's tightening cordon is seen as a threat by Russia's leadership, making it less likely we can secure Russian cooperation to contain Iran's nuclear program. Some adversaries, such as Iran itself, are near-nuclear. The Iraq war is seen by Iran's leaders as a direct attempt to control its neighborhood and place a U.S. ally on its doorstep (just as we are working to negotiate military alliances on Russia's doorstep).

To be sure, the leaders of Russia, Iran and our other adversaries are culpable for their own expansionist policies. They hardly need American provocation to pursue arms buildups or aggression against their neighbors, and the rich gas and oil resources in the Caucasus give Russia incentive to exert control over its neighbors in that region. Where does that leave us? Between a rock and a hard place.

Now comes the Bush administration's plan to place anti-missile missiles in Poland, ostensibly to deter a nuclear attack on Europe from Iran. The plan, pushed by the White House and congressional Republicans including McCain, is a subtle admittance that our European defense strategy now relies on three words: duck and cover.

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System — the missile shield under design for Poland — is not only unproven and potentially useless, it is years from being operational. Worse, it is extraordinarily provocative to Russia. And worst of all, the U.S. also has agreed to place Patriot missiles in Poland. The Patriots' short range makes them useful only against one adversary: Russia.

How Did It Come to This?

After 9/11, the Bush administration cobbled together a rash and reckless foreign policy of democratic expansionism, scorn for international law, disregard for diplomacy and reliance on economic and military pressure. The results of that policy include squandered goodwill and growing extremism overseas, frayed strategic alliances and increasingly brazen challenges to American power. But the effects of the Bush Doctrine go well beyond damage to our international relations and interests.

With the support of congressional allies, the Bush Doctrine has managed to weaken our defense by seriously degrading our force levels, recruiting standards, troop morale, equipment inventory and deployment preparedness. In short, the Pentagon's avowed goal of being able to wage two majors wars at once lies in ruin. The long war on terror has seen America open two major fronts — Afghanistan and Iraq — without closure in either case. These two wars, along with NATO's push to expand its membership, also have left Western Europe weaker overall. By stretching its obligations to include former Soviet satellites with poor defenses, NATO has over-committed itself and has little leverage to force Russia from the territories it overran in Georgia.

Western Europe and the former Russian satellites planning to join NATO are, for all practical purposes, rapidly becoming defenseless. Russia was able to drive into Georgia not because the West did not wish to stop Russia, but because we cannot afford to stop it. That is the reason, often overlooked, for the missile shield treaty that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just signed with Poland's leaders. And it is why Russian leaders have declared that Poland leaves itself open to a strike if the missiles are installed.

“It is going to be easier to make our case on Capitol Hill now,” said Representative Trent Franks, Republican of Arizona, a proponent of the program, “as this has reminded Poland and some of the other nations formerly dominated by the Soviet Union that the coercive Russia mind-set of militarily threatening your neighbors has not completely disappeared.”

Twilight's Last Gleaming

We are returning to the balance of power — and the accompanying impotence — of the Cold War. The difference is that our conventional forces are pinned down in too many places and worn thin, just as our economy and diplomacy are hollow shells of their former might. Our nuclear leverage is no leverage at all, and the world knows it. We cannot unleash the atomic genie and return it safely to its bottle before touching off a chain reaction of events that could lead to our own destruction.

Threats are rising in every corner of the globe while our ability to respond, either alone or in concert with our allies, has grown weak. In the dark alley we find ourselves in, will John McCain rebuild diplomacy or go it alone without the allies he ridicules so easily? Will he strengthen the economy or destroy the middle class that has always been the source of American strength? Will he use our armed forces judiciously or put our troops in harm's way on principle rather than pragmatism? Will he risk all against our adversaries? Will he risk provoking a first strike? Will he risk lighting up some brisk autumn evening because the darkness is pressing in?