Michael Maiello's picture

    Slaughter In Syria?

    I worry when I write about the Middle East because I have no confidence that I know what I'm talking about and probably less interest in the differences and similarities between a Shiite and an Alawite than I do in whether or not I think that Richard Foreman's latest play at New York's Public Theater was any good (it was not.)  I sometimes confuse Wahabi with the condiment for sushi.  Heck, I don't even feel bad about this -- if the sectarian issues of the Islamic world didn't intrude into my own, uninvited, I'd be fine with that.

    That said, they have intruded and since we buy their oil and since the Western world, generations ago, messed up the Middle East's maps, we do have to pay some attention.  The New Yorker has generously made this article by Dexter Filkins available.  It explains why simple actions like a No Fly Zone enforced by the United States will likely not work and will only serve as the first steps of a slippery slope into deeper engagement.  It also explains how a hands off approach won't work either and could result in a Rwanda level failure.  It explains how Syria is more complicated than Libya and it also acknowledges the political reality -- that Obama gained very little at home for successfully deposing Qadafi and suffered politically the moment something went wrong (Benghazi).  Filkins also acknowledges that the American public has no appetite for getting involved in another military adventure and unlike a lot of commentators, he seems to think that U.S. public opinion counts for something.

    Filkins discusses, at length, the political consequences of acting militarily when there is no immediate pressing U.S. defense rationale and it's fairly simple: while the academic and policy communities might criticize a failure to act, as they have criticized Clinton for both Bosnia (slow action) and Rwanda (inaction) this is not something that voters care much about.  Voters made clear what they cared about, which was avoiding a repeat of the Black Hawk Down scenario in Somalia, a military venture started by the lame duck George H.W. Bush as he was leaving office.

    Fine, say the critics.  But we don't vote on everything and our leaders need to act on and define our national ideals.  Besides, you opened this piece with a lame joke about wahabi and wasabi, so why should you get a say? To which I answer, "because I'm paying for," both in terms of present and future taxes and in terms of the government's priorities.  Any dollar spent on a bullet in Syria can better be spent on a domestic project with direct benefits to American voters.  I want Obama's priorities at home.  I do not want him lurching into another budget crisis with the Republicans with a new war bill on top of everything else.

    The foreign policy elite does not seem to care about this.  Anne Marie Slaughter, president of the New America Foundation, former state department staffer for Hillary Clinton and professor at Princeton was one of the pre-Iraq hawks from the left and is a huge proponent of the "Responsibility To Protect" concept, where the Western powers feel compelled, despite domestic political concerns, to intervene whenever it seems likely that a government has turned violent against its own people.

    She recently wrote in The Washington Post that U.S. credibility is on the line in Syria, because Assad has been accused of using chemical weapons. The Filkins article seems to accept that Assad is likely responsible for doing this, on a small scale, though is acknowledges that there is doubt about whether or not chemical weapons have actually been used and, if so, which side used them.  Pro-intervention commentators like Slaughter write that Assad used chemical weapons as if it is a certain fact.  To back this up, however, they have to mischaracterize the intelligence behind the assertion.  Really, all an impartial observer can say at this point is that somebody (Assad, Assad loyalists operating as rogues, some element of the rebellion) may or may not have used chemical weapons.  We definitely don't have the facts to determine whether or not a "red line" has been crossed.

    The undeniable presence of these weapons, which will fall into the hands of the victors in Syria (some of whom are Islamic extremists who will be unfriendly to the west) is a huge complicating factor in this whole mess.  The U.S. cannot secure or destroy these weapons reliably.  The U.S. can't even "arm the rebels" without risking putting sophisticated surface to air missiles in the hands of the next generation of extremists.

    In the Filkins article, Slaughter is quoted that Obama's inaction would mean, "The world would see Syrian civilians rolling on the ground, foaming at the mouth, dying by the thousands while the United States stands by.”

    Slaughter's grand guignol language is meant not to argue a course of action but to manipulate U.S. policy.  She is obscuring the fact that she is asking the U.S. to enter a civil war where the winning side will attempt to exterminate the losers.  The Alawites, says Filkins, which are the minority ruling party, have already tried to set up an emergency enclave where they will have access to support from Iran, Hezbollah and Russia if they are tossed out of Damascus.  The victorious rebels will not allow an Alawite state to be formed on Syrian soil.  This is a battle to the end and Slaughter wants the U.S. to get right into the middle of it.

    If we follow Slaughter's advice, who will suffer for it?  The same volunteer soldiers who we have over-used and abused throughout two multi-decade wars in this region.  These soldiers are being drawn disproportionately from the segments of the American economy that have most failed to serve the people since the onset of The Great Recession.  While Slaughter traffics in elite concepts of global governance and responsibility, the real work of fulfilling her vision falls to the people with the least influence in American politics.

    That Slaughter continues to enjoy credibility after Iraq is amazing.  Maybe the decision about what to do in Syria should be left to the American public.  They know what they want and the first responsibility of the U.S. government is to the will of its own people, not to the impulse to pick winners and losers in Syria.

     

     

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    Comments

    I do not believe we should intervene with military support in Syria. While we can offer a way to get to peace talks and negotiations, we cannot select sides. Both sides in this case appear to be very wrong. Each side will commit genocide against their enemy if they are in power.  There will be no democracy as we know it, there will be another theocracy, with different people in power. We cannot take the McCain, Graham and the other Neo-Con Wrong Wing direction. First of all, we simply don't have the people to commit to fighting on another front in W. Asia, secondly, when are we going to learn our lesson about being the police of the world? When has that one worked out? When are we going to seek another way to end these regional conflicts? When does diplomacy win?

    So far, this President doesn't appear to be listening to those knuckleheads who would engage us in yet another police action. He knows the score, those neo-cons would blame the President for listening to them anyway when things go wrong. I hope I'm right. And I do think Assad is a particularly evil man, I do. But we need to learn to find another way to end these regional conflicts, because the fighting is never ending. If we haven't learned anything, I hope we at least have learned that.


    "He knows the score, those neo-cons would blame the President for listening to them anyway when things go wrong..."

    Yeah, I think he's been burned one too many times.  The continued focus on Benghazi is just proof.  Were Obama to devise a mission to roll in, secure all of the chemical weapons, disarm the extremists and form an elected parliament, the Republicans in the Senate would hold hearings about a jeep that's tire blew out, causing a General to spill his coffee.


    I see Slaughter 'in Syria' leading a cadre of armed Princeton students and intervention believers into the bloody sarin tinged morass of Syria!

    No Slaughter won't go. As you point out: If we follow Slaughter's advice, who will suffer for it?  The same volunteer soldiers who we have over-used and abused throughout two multi-decade wars in this region. 


    That’s Samuel’s essential quandary, and it’s the predicament of all Foreman characters. On some level, they’re always stuck in Philosophy 101, trying to figure out what’s real and what’s imagined and to express that dichotomy in a satisfactory way.

    It doesn't seem to occur to some critics and theater-goers that the reason the characters are all stuck in Philosophy 101 is that Richard Foreman is stuck in Philosophy 101.  Not only that, but Foreman tends to not even take Philosophy 101 seriously.  In a tedious intellectual anti-intellectualism, he embraces philosophy only to mock it.  Since he won't (can't?) take it past the 101 class, all one gets is material mocking material that is all set up to be mocked.  It is like Foreman sitting next to you watching the first episode of American Idol and pointing out that the really bad singers auditioning are really bad, the show kind of sucks, and one could be doing something more productive than watching someone embarrass themselves for 15 seconds of fame.

    That this particular reviewer doesn't mention Samuel Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape as a point of reference serves alone to discredit the reviewer as having anything useful to say.  

    http://www.trbimg.com/img-5077a1f2/turbine/la-174626-ca-1009-krapps4-ac.jpg-20121011/600


    We saw the Foreman show last weekend and I was kind of so stunned by how bad it was that I almost devoted an entire blog to it, but didn't have time.  Foreman seemed trapped, as a director, in old Brechtian notions that audiences have long ago adapted to.  Nobody is jarred back to reality by lights in the face anymore.  We've all been to concerts.

    And, I don't hold Becket and Foreman to be in the same class.  Not at all.


    Back in the 20th Century I read an interview with a playwright discussing his latest play - I can't remember the name of it, but over the course of the play chairs begin to pile up in a bar or restaurant, each one representing someone who had died AIDS.  What I remember from the interview was the interviewer asking him to comment on what some critics said was excessive sentimentality. 

    His response was that in effect that given all the experimental theater since Brecht, Becket, et al. and the attempts to explore new techniques, methods, notions of what constituted stage, audience, etc., the only thing left to explore, i.e. the only thing that offered risk, was sentimentality. I don't know if I entirely agree with him, but it is an intriguing notion.


    That is interesting.  Mac Wellman, when he teaches, directs his students to write plays that contain things the author hates to sit through. Sentimentality is a common response.  Also, children and animals on stage...


    This is superbly written, Michael. (It's almost too good, as I find myself being dazzled by the construction of it so that I do not think on the content as much. Ah, the mixed blessings of talent.devil)


    I'll take my humblebrag on this one.  Eh, I'll drop the humble.  I liked writing this.


    Michael,

    I have to say this is a fabulous piece of writing, and very much appreciated.  I come out differently, sort of, and have tried to articulate where I'm coming from.   One quibble I have is that I don't consider my position to require adherence to anything a Slaughter writes, because it is not my position.  I'm just into stopping the mass murder, and I just cannot accept the notion that there is nothing the world can do: (1) in light of the undisputed death toll; and (2) the fact that the whole world is watching right now.  

    I understand there are no easy answers.  But I also submit that one need not be an isolationist in order to reject neo-conservative notions of nation-building.

    You really outdid yourself though.  This is a terrific piece.  Thanks buddy.

     

     


    Of course there's something the world could do. As soon as the US, Russia, and China agree on what that is we all could do it very quickly. Do you have any suggestion as to what solution the US, Russia, and China could agree on?

    There lies the basic problem. Getting the US, Russia, and China to agree is well nigh  impossible.


    No, I don't have any idea how to get the three powers to agree on anything, except that it could be material that the Soviets have shifted on their insistence that Assad remain in control of the government.  Your point is well taken.


    Yeah, I need to find a path from all these complexities to your point about stopping mass murder.  I'm glad you enjoyed my arguing with myself.  I respect your conclusion.  I even agree with it.  I want to stop mass murder too.  I just worry about enabling future massacres, unintended consequences and, more than anything, the motives of our own elite.  I never fret over your motives.


    Bruce, this op-ed struck me as exceptionally eye clearing: The real danger of Syria’s sectarian stalemate by Bernard Haykel, The Globe and Mail. It took me back to the big picture. Maybe it will help you too.

    In a situation where there's so many potential proxy wars already inherent, the neo-liberal ethos of Slaughter types seems exceptionally naive. Seems to me that most kinds of interference in a situation like this only serves to escalate--more Cold War or Afghanistan or Vietnam or Iraq style, not so much Kosovo or Libya style. Despite horrific loss of life and other misery, any kind of force cannot be help in a situation like this, as it only serves escalation of long-term animosities, and the only tools that have any potential are diplomacy and humantarian aid? Too many proxies = long-term quagmire?

    (It occurs to me now why this article struck me too when I saw it the other day: How Do You Say 'Quagmire' in Farsi? Why Syria could turn out to be Iran's Vietnam -- not America's.)


    Sorry AA, I'm in transit in one of my favorite places, Buffalo!  No joke, I love it up here and am awed by the folks who I get to represent up here.  Point is, other than finishing up my little colloquy on manners with PP, I've had no time to read your article.  I will, I promise.  Also, look up Michael Young, who has an interesting article on Alawite exit strategy. No time to get cite now but just do the google.  He speaks of contingency plans to establish an Assad-safe Alawite enclave (a mini-nation state) if things continue this way.  

    Just for clarification.  My focus on international intervention would be on separating forces, and not occupying the country with the expectation that it will look like Peoria in a couple of years.  And I'm no military expert, but I'm bothered by what I see as knee-jerk isolationism, which just doesn't seem to have the most wonderful track record in the world, historically.  And I think it's fair to discuss this without the showroom dummy, cereal box-top knee jerk response that anyone who wants to consider intervention is a Dick Cheney in disguise.  That's not what Michael was doing when he wrote this, but that's the discussion I've been obliged to participate in, culminating in the idiocy of parsing the definition of genocide as an end game for some.

    P.S.  I was gonna get pissed about being asked about Israel's "position" by some folks in this thread.  But I guess I've earned that distinction.  I trust you understand that Israel's posture has nothing to do with this American's consideration of American intervention to stop the slaughter (is that word OK?) in Syria.

     


    Leon Wieseltier refers to Filkins' article when taking on what he calls the "cult of the exit strategy!:

    A “senior American official who is involved in Syria policy” plaintively said this to Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker: “People on the Hill ask me, ‘Why can’t we do a no-fly zone? Why can’t we do military strikes?’ Of course we can do these things. The issue is, where will it stop?” The answer is, we don’t know. But is the gift of prophecy really a requirement for historical action? Must we know the ending at the beginning? If so, then nobody would start a business, or a book, or a medical treatment, or a love affair, let alone an invasion of Omaha Beach. We can have certainty about our objectives but not about our circumstances. The most serious action is often improvisatory, though its purposes should always be clear. The prestige of “the exit strategy” in our culture is another American attempt to deny the contingency of experience and assert mastery over what cannot be mastered—in this instance, it is American control-freakishness applied to the use of American force. But we often engage with what we cannot master. No outcomes are assured, except perhaps when we do nothing. We do not need to control the realm in which we need to take action; we need only to have strong and defensible reasons and strong and defensible means, and to keep our wits, our analytical abilities, about us. After all, there are many ways, good and bad, to end a military commitment, as Obama himself has shown. All this talk of exiting is designed only to inhibit us from entering. Like its cousin “the slippery slope,” “the exit strategy” is demagoguery masquerading as prudence.


    Wieselthier also takes on what he calls the "eclipse of humanitarianism" and the rise of realism:

    Seventy thousand people have died in the Syrian war, most of them at the hands of their ruler. Since this number has appeared in the papers for many months, the actual number must be much higher. The slaughter is unceasing. But the debate about American intervention is increasingly conducted in “realist” terms: the threat to American interests posed by jihadism in Syria, the intrigues of Iran and Hezbollah, the rattling of Israel, the ruination of Jordan and Lebanon and Iraq. Those are all good reasons for the president of the United States to act like the president of the United States. But wouldn’t the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal war be reason enough? Is the death of scores and even hundreds of thousands, and the displacement of millions, less significant for American policy, and less quickening? The moral dimension must be restored to our deliberations, the moral sting, or else Obama, for all his talk about conscience, will have presided over a terrible mutilation of American discourse: the severance of conscience from action.

    (emphasis added)

     


    Bruce, I just ditched a whole, long reply to you because I thought, on rereading, that it was preachy and you don't need to be preached at.  Wieselthier, I respect a lot.  I get where he's coming from.  This, and I'll leave your bold, is a damning question:

    "But wouldn’t the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal war be reason enough?"

    That is where Christopher Hitchens broke with the left.  We can make up other reasons, but that's it.

    When I write against intervention in Syria, I do it knowing that I am in some sense writing in favor of Assad, who is a fascist.  I do it knowing that I have called and treated other people as fascists who have not come near Assad's level.  I write it knowing that Assad has slaughtered 70,000 people and will kill more, and that I am arguing only that some people on the other side might well want to do the same, if they can muster the power.

    Also, what Obama accomplished in Libya, despite the lack of political award, was impressive and good for the world.  I know that.

    Where I really get stuck is this, and I think that you'll understand this, as a labor guy.  I didn't grow up rich, but I never considered, even for a serious moment, joining the military.  Never had to consider it, so I never did.  To say we should go to war makes me feel like I'm Massey saying that we should dig a deeper mine.  Go for it!  I won't be buried in it.

    When we debate this stuff, we talk about what we didn't do in Rwanda but we never talk about the U.S. soldiers that didn't die there.  We never say: "This former Marine who now has a family, a house and pool and grandkids on the way would have been torn apart in the Rwandan civil war, had Clinton made a different decision in 1994." That's also a tragedy averted.

    I just have a hard time asking other people to give their lives when I know that I'm not every going to Damascus with a gun and that our "volunteers" didn't necessarily have every one of life's options available when they enlisted.


    Did Assad kill 70,000, or did 70,000 die from actions by both sides?

    This is part of my problem with intervention - we laden up our preferred side with a lot of inaccuracies, and then go to war with our biased focus.

    What's bizarre about our world policy since the 1970's is that we keep building up every disruption as a game-changing world threat.

    We used to be able to have local wars and proxy wars and be able to juggle them with more important things. Now we have the Islamic Terrorist Domino Theory vs Rwanda vs Easy Regime Change as our main framings, and every fight is either preventing holocaust and/or stopping the Mongol hordes crossing the steppes. (lnote: we're getting away from Powell's "go in with overwhelming force", and actually cheapening up)

    If the 70,000 were just a one-way rout, I might even think about intervention. But we already intervened - we have CIA on the ground, we've run in weapons, between the different NATO & gulf powers we already have our fingerprints all over what was supposed to be easy regime change - when we assumed the Syrian rebels were the same mostly kinda good guys that the Libyans were)

    It's a shame that the Arab Spring didn't become one of our main models, as we'd helped that with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose revolution in Georgia, the people's protests against Milosevic in Serbia. That was our calling card - our "insurgency" was promoting democratic protests, not armed revolt. And it worked even in Tunisia & Egypt.

    So now the liberals are here debating intervention vs. non-intervention, and we've forgotten the other alternative. The conservative warmongers have won again - they've framed the situation exactly to get our no-win outcome, and the only thing we'll see is bigger and bigger arms sales.

    I'm going back to sleep.


    My assumption is that Assad is largely at fault for his choice of response at the threshold but now there is plenty of blame to share and blood on lots of hands. 


    Michael,

    You and I share a common upbringing in that sense.  When I was 17 I went to college at a time when we were wasted from Viet Nam and unlike my Dad I never considered the military.  But I had plenty of friends and classmates who did join and they did so because of economic necessity, or a sense of duty or a mixture of both.   And their service and my college is a data point I'm now stuck with.  

    And so you pose the question that has plagued me for decades. What right do those of us who did not serve have to determine whether our kids should be sent off to risk life or limb?  Totally fair to bring up that and I have no answer that gives me peace.   

    And, Michael, take it from a guy who can be accused of preachiness. You, my friend, have earned the right to preach to me as you please.  I mean that.


    If there was truly genocide occurring in Syria, an organized, deliberate plan to eliminate an entire population, do you honestly believe Israel, which came into being as a result of such crimes, would do nothing?

    I don't believe so. Perhaps Israeli actions in eliminating missiles and munitions in Syria, in addition to protecting Israel, sends a message to Assad that Israel is watching him, and they are not afraid to strike him when and where they choose.


    I wouldn't depend on Israel to do be a bellwether of how to respond on moral grounds to a genocide in Syria.   I think the US has to make its own judgments.  And maybe we just can't get there anymore because so many of us have become too wary of intervention based on damn good reason, that the concept of  stopping genocide has been hijacked and subsumed by a nation building movement   that has utterly failed us and those on whose behalf we intervene.  

    As to whether there is genocide occurring I guess I've assumed that to be the case.   But would it matter to you in terms of what we should do if what was going on was a genocide under a definition of your choosing?  That is the issue I think we are wrestling with. 


    What's going on in Syria is a violent, deadly power struggle. While not a bellwether, I believe Israel knows more about what is going on in their region than does the US, and if there was a campaign of genocide across her border, I have no doubt Israel would expose it to the world.


    Cromwell managed to wipe out a quarter of Ireland's population or more.

    Pol Pot wiped out 1/7th of Cambodia's population, 1 million.

    Mao Tse Tung killed some 20 million or more with his ironically named "Great Leap Forward" (off a cliff?)

    We have pretty good definitions of genocide - I suggest not turning a molehill into a mountain so to speak. Syria has 20 million people - 70,000 deaths are not genocide, no matter how unfortunate.


    But what if those same 70,000 belong to a specific targeted sub-set of the Syrian population?  Rather than being 70,000 out of 20,000,000; it becomes something like 70,000 out of 190,000.


    Then 19,810,000 Syrians are safe, in the clear. Almost all of the 1.4 million refugees are good to go, back home.  Only 120,000 need protection.


    That wasn't my point.  The number of 120,000 was just some number I pulled out of my arse.  My point was: Especially in places like Africa and the Middle East the borders of the various states do not correspond to perspectives of ideology and religion, nor to ethnicity, etc.  The border of Syria for the purposes of discussing genocide is an arbitrary line of demarcation.  One might as well as say, 'well, there is almost 7 billion people on this planet, so 70 thousand is hardly something to get so bent out of shape about.' 

    Moreover, genocide is hardly just a matter of mathematics, some terrible critical mass percentage (54.82% for instance) which flips something from not being a genocide to being genocide.  [Some similar attraction to the mathematical approach can be seen how the carnage of the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in the 90's hardly changed America while the carnage of the second terrorist attack turned America's world upside down]

    A key question has to be: Are the 70,000 victims who were killed represent some group who happen to live in Syria and who have been targetted for extinction?


    An example of genocide - when all the thousands of residents of a city are surrounded and captured by armed militias, and every last one is executed and buried in a mass grave (in an attempt to cover up the crime), as happened in Srebrenica see my link below.


    You're arguing semantics about the use of the term genocide; I've heard tell this is quite a popular debate for many sundry participants with various agenda. It goes round and round and never gets resolved because it's all about the impact of a single very loaded word.

    So what if we were to avoid the word and go to something less loaded? How about "ethnic cleansing"? Were the accusations of ethnic cleansing, along with loads of refugees running into the mountains with winter coming, the history of major grievance, tribal fighting and extreme violence, a dictator with a lot of weapons favoring one side, and the possibility of escalation of war in the greater region enough to make you support the Clinton intervention in Kosovo? I think that's more like what we are talking about here, similar possibilities of a situation growing a lot worse, similar "evidence," similar refugee flight....



    (1) Kosovo, a part of a disintegrating Yugoslavia,  is in Europe. Syria is in the Middle East.

    (2) Kosovo is a little over 4,000 square miles, Syria over 71,000, and well over 10 times the population.

    (3) The Kosovo intervention was supported by NATO nations and armed forces, and by UN resolutions.

    (4) There were documented acts of genocide/extermination by Serb forces, in the Srebrenica massacre, over 8,000 Muslims under UN protection were ruthlessly removed and murdered by Serb forces.

    ....not a single US service member was killed in combat during the Kosovo operation.

    Over 4,800 US troops died, and tens of thousands were wounded, bringing 'freedom' to the Middle Eastern nation of Iraq, which borders Syria. 

    The Iraq government we put into place over nearly a decade of occupation allowed or initiated ethnic cleansing, in spite of the presence of our troops.

     


      It should perhaps be said that the Shiites who cleansed Sunnis had suffered extreme provocation; they were butchered and tormented by Sunnis both under Saddam Hussein and in the years after the American invasion.


    There are always excuses aren't there?


    Yeah, and if the situation results in a civil war the Sunnis can now cite the extreme provocation of the Shiites to justify any of their atrocities and it goes on and on and on.

    "An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind." - Mahatma Gandhi


       Yes, but excuses that don't involve your people getting massacred are less convincing as mitigation. The excuse for the ethnic cleansing of Germans after World War II (the Germans did terrible things to us) is better than the excuse for Nazi exterminations(they've done us no harm, but they have no right to live).


    Another "give me a break" moment. If someone uses the word "genocide" they're using semantics to try to make an event heavy. Killing 70,000 people during an uprising is typically not "genocide" - especially if killed by both sides - nor is it "kindergarten lunch". Words have meanings, I'm afraid to tell you, and grossly misusing them usually doesn't do much good.

    "Ethnic cleansing" - well, if an ethnic group rises up against the government, are you surprised the government retaliates? If the ethnic group is armed by wealthy western governments who've overthrown several neighboring governments, are you again surprised? That doesn't mean I don't support peaceful uprisings, but we decided we liked the Libyan precedent instead, and it just didn't turn out as pretty.

    "A dictator with a lot of weapons favoring one side"? How about a pissed off Sunni majority with large parts of it pushing a fundamentalist state, tied to foreign mercenaries, engaging in atrocities against civilians? How do those Sunnis treat Christians & Druze along with Alawites. Compare this to the situation in Kosovo - Serbs vs. Kosovars, mostly unarmed & unsupported Kosovars, events initiated by Milosevic to create nationalistic fervor at the expense of the repressed majority, and it's not even close. (wasn't until years later that the Albanian KLA armed resistance started, after the ensuing Bosnian War). The level of Serb atrocities in Kosovo was fairly low despite the heated hyperbole, though after Bosnia, it's not surprising rumor would work against Milosevic.

    Note the discussion of rebel ethnic cleansing in various areas of Syria on page 2.

    Really, we set this stage during Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, and we've kept pretty close to that script - remember all Saddam's WMD's supposedly whisked off to Syria? Well we got that pseudo-Arab Spring and the refugee crisis - if only we had a more pristine rebel force, we'd already be invading. As it is, we're a bit conflicted as to our roadmap on the way to Petraeusville.


    BTW, here Noam Chomsky does a post-op on our Kosovo War. Including the over-hyped use of "genocide". Ex-post facto reasoning seemed to be the rule of propaganda engagement. We've gotten better at it though - find a Milosevic, find an ethnic cleansing story, and then the bombs can take over. Pretty easy recipe for microwave meatloaf.


    Jeepers.  I'm the one who used genocide, and I am not friggin' wedded to it for the reasons AA articulated.  And my second-guessing of automatic isolationism does not in any way depend upon the existence of a genocide per se. 

    I am glad, however, that you acknowledge that words have meaning.   I think we've been on opposite sides of that argument on occasion.  

     

     


    If you can point me to a place I said or acted like words have no meaning, happy to review & see if a retraction in order.

    Words can be important even if sometimes "sticks and stones..." might be a better reaction, and sometimes people fall to the fainting couch over some less-than-tragic affront that others might think discussion, whereas sometimes sexist/ethnic/cultural phrasing is indeed offensive & beyond the Pale.  (these are all context-dependent, so saying something to your mum vs. your buddy smoking behind school are 2 different settings. occasionally our tolerant progressive blog is less-than-tolerant for discussing issues, and so forth. YMMV.)

     


    I'm just sayin' and I think accurately.  Next time I express a bit more sensitivity about something said or written about Jews or Zionists, think about what you wrote here about words mattering, and pause before you launch into your Bruce is possessed by demons bit.  It might make for less chaicoxabrum and more discourse.  


    I've written 10's of thousands of words trying to get discourse. Just because Bruce is offended by a position opposing his own or finds a word offensive doesn't mean I stepped over the line. And often words are used to reflexively frame the argument - don't say this or that or you've offended, so the debater has to argue within a pre-allocated set of assumptions. Semantics & rhetoric sometimes work like that.


    A rather selfish response, I think PP.  I read your comment to mean that words matter only when you say they do. 


    Quite the opposite - I'm saying they don't suddenly have overriding significance just because you say they do.

    But to be fair, yes, we're both selfish and want words and our arguments to frame our preferences. You say to-may-to and I say to-mah-to. But quite frankly, I hop & dance around a lot of your sensitivities re: being Jewish, the holocaust, the precarious situation of Israel in the Mideast. You don't have to worry too much about my personal sensitivity because for the most part I haven't got one - more like Marvin the Paranoid Android. I don't have a dog in most of these fights - I'm arguing from preference, not partially from identity.

    Now often I do play Devil's Advocate - not to be contrary so much as the rush to full agreement tends to display huge holes in logic and a good deal of situational hypocrisy - such as the morals we might most espouse get chucked out the window the moment of some kind of inconvenience. And often words are used to entrench the status quo, make sure no one steps out of line and comes up with an original thought. And sometimes using the uncatholic phrasing can allow some different perspective, maybe break through an impasse in thought & habit. So yeah, words can be important for a number of reasons, not just as a danger sign, but as a rhetorical aid.


    Thought I had responded before, and I guess it didn't work.  I'm rushed but for your last comment it doesn't matter.  Beyond the high fallootin stuff by an obviously very talented and really smart writer, what I take out of your comment is that I tend to place a presumption of respect on the sensitivities of my brothers and sisters and you are too busy trying to win arguments solely for the sake thereof to give a shit about other people.

    OK. Have the last word PP.  We all know it really does rock your boat.


    Oh, I think you summed it up - Peracles just wants to win arguments & doesn't give a shit about people's feelings. Yep, I'm Teh Evil.


    Point taken, my reply was stupid. I don't think you are The Evil (that would be Wolraich) by any stretch of the imagination.  Sometimes (lots of times) you piss me off, and sometimes I think you are an asshole, but generally I think you're OK in a thorn in the paw kind of way, and I certainly do not think you are The Evil.  Sorry PP, my bad.

     


    No prob.

    I was just looking back to find a comment I'd made near real-time about the Benghazi consulate, and came across this BSLEV gem:

    http://dagblog.com/reader-blogs/dagblog-limbo-14892#comment-164979

    Of course words like the "5 high-five dancing Israelis" matter.


       The Serbs killed several thousand civilians  in Kosovo during the ten weeks of the Nato war, and about half a million were driven out(not counting those killed or expelled before Nato intervention). I wouldn't call that "fairly low". And although I opposed the Kosovo War, I think Chomsky's writings on the subject are largely junk, part of the reason why I no longer admire him.


    Yeah, where are those huge mass graves everyone assured us existed?

    While I'm not the hugest Chomsky fan, in this case much of the go-to-war excuses were overhyped FUD.

    There were about 100,000 who left Kosovo before the bombing (how many were "expelled" vs. just left for safety?) & about 1/4 million displaced internally. Of course part of this involved the KLA's actions.

    While I note that Milosevic started the playup of nationalism in the region, there was still some Albanian responsibility:

    The KLA, formed in 1991,[69] initiated its first campaign in 1995 when it launched attacks targeting Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo, and in June 1996 the group claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage targeting Kosovo police stations. In 1997, the organization acquired a large amount of arms through weapons smuggling from Albania, following a rebellion which saw large numbers of weapons looted from the country's police and army posts. It was regarded by the United States, the United Kingdom and France as a terrorist group until 1998, when it was de-listed without explanation.[70] In 1998, KLA attacks targeting Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo resulted in an increased presence of Serb paramilitaries and regular forces whom subsequently began pursuing a campaign of retribution targeting KLA sympathizers and political opponents[71] in a drive which left 1,500 to 2,000 combatants and civilians dead[72] and led to the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees

    Hmmm, sounds significantly lower than the numbers of combatants & civilians we left dead in Iraq & Afghanistan.

    Once NATO started a 78-day bombing campaign, well, I suppose the sporting thing for the Serbs to have done is stand out in fields and be properly killed, instead of tricking the allies and pushing out as many Kosovars as possible. (there is some question whether "Operation Horseshoe" actually existed or whether most of the exodus was a Kosovan strategic/political move or mass self-preservation - I can't parse all the propaganda on each side, so will assume Milosevic 60-70% responsible)

    David Morrison notes the escalation by the KLA in 1998 to 2000 attacks, and the rather ironic fact that "up to mid-January 1999 the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than Yugoslav forces". He then goes on to describe the humanitarian crisis that NATO bombing provoked - seems instigating peace from the air isn't that easy after all. (after all, NATO's goal was "to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried out by the Yugoslav security forces against the Kosovar Albanians, and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in future". Oops.

    Estimates of those killed by Milosevic during the war were quite inflated.

    (via Radio Free Europe, i.e. the report is more neutral, not just Yugoslavian propaganda)

    The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) in Belgrade has presented a new report on the dead and missing people from the 1998-99 Kosovo war, RFE/RL's Balkan Service reports.

    According to the report, 13,321 individuals were killed, wounded, or went missing in the period from January 1998, when rebel groups fought Yugoslav forces, during the NATO bombing of 1999, and until the arrival of the international peacekeeping mission in December 2000.

    The report says the fate of 1,886 individuals is still unknown.

    Some 8,000-10,000 of those on the list of war victims were ethnic Albanians, while some 2,000–2,500 were Serbs, Roma, Bosnians, and ethnic Albanians who were loyal to Serbia.

    What did happen after the war was the ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs from Kosovo, and the unilateral declaration by most countries to then accept Kosovo's self-declared independence. While overall I agree that majorities for regions should be able to vote themselves independent, there's quite a bit of colonialist meddling in all our old stomping grounds to achieve this by force when convenient, using over-optimistic speeches and self-congratulatory arguments. Certainly Britain's record of providing democracy to ex-colonies is mixed, such as helping overthrow Iran's government or its other various Mideast task-masters/hastily drawn lines in sand, or the cut-and-run solution in Burma.


      It was reported that a quarter of a million left Kosovo before the Nato bombing. You've listed some of the reasons I opposed the Kosovo war(why are you trying to persuade me after I already said I opposed it?), but I can't agree that Milosevic was only partly responsible for the exodus.


      By the way, the mass graves were found.

    http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/graves.htm

      One or two Britons who testified before a Parliamentary commission claimed that, before Racak, the KLA were responsible for the greater number of casualties; I don't know if that was ever confirmed. They didn't say that the KLA had killed more civilians than the Serbs.


     

    I didn't say there weren't atrocities committed, but during the hysteria of 1999 there was frequent speculation that there would be far far worse than what this article tells, and the numbers that followup investigations came up with. Even the "untold thousands" line used here is a tipoff - no, it's not "untold thousands" in 2013. There were roughly 11000 killed in the war & 2000 missing (presumably partly included in 2 mass graves found in Serbia). Certainly fewer than the NATO-predicted 100,000 already dead before the bombing (and the roughly  70,000 dead in Syria from both sides to date, presuming stats are correct).

    Remember - this was a multinational bombing campaign under UN auspices that removed control over Kosovo and took Kosovo out of Serbia/Yugoslavia by force to make it independent. The horrible killing of 1000 people wouldn't justify such political action or we'd be invading half the world every day. We needed a huge black-and-white tale of evil vs good.

    Here's a Council of Europe report of the KLA killing prisoners and selling organs

    Here's a 1998 listing of civilians killed by KLA.

    Here's how you win a PR war ahead of time, get Godwin on your side. The formula is so simple, bugger the facts.

    Here you can see some pretty serious doubts about the Racak massacre from French AP & Le Monde reporters, including those accompanying the Serb raid on the village. But this single pre-bombing event was used to justify the invasion.


      You didn't deny there were atrocities, but you denied there were mass graves, hence the link.

      It seems like you're trying to persuade me that the Kosovo War was unjustified, but I said I already thought that.

     I don't think the wikipedia article casts any real doubt on the Racak massacre. We have eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence indicating a massacre, and against that we have two guys who say they saw fighting, but don't deny there was a massacre.


    Well, I might have muddied this a bit - my position is that there were mass graves & Serb atrocities, including against civilians, but nowhere near the 100,000 scare numbers NATO used to justify the bombings, and most likely coming during the bombings and not beforeas we had pretty good satellite & overflight tracking to keep an eye on large movements.

    Re: Racak, we have 2 AP filmers + reporters from Figaro, Le Monde and AFP, with the film apparently supporting that the village was empty of civilians. We have reports of mutilated bodies (including by Walker I believe) that were later recanted. We have 2 suspect inquiries from Serbia & Belorus, but then we have a Finnish inquiry that for some reason was never release, only some comments of its head were suggested to be the final report but they weren't, and later she noted the pressure she was under to make her report more suggestive.

    And yes, there was reporting on the other side, BBC & ITN, etc.


      The AP reporters didn't say the place was empty of civilians on that day. They said that "virtually" all had left earlier, but they acknowledged that a group of fleeing villagers were intercepted by Serb police(What happened then? They don't say). The wikipedia article speaks of Albanian survivors being interviewed, so clearly the place hadn't been empty of inhabitants. A massacre of 45 people isn't inconsistent with virtually all the inhabitants having left, if "virtually" meant something like 80-90 percent.

     I haven't heard that the Finnish pathologist said she was under pressure to doctor the report. I read excerpts of the report on the internet; these parts, at least, indicate there was a massacre.


       I also have to ask if they inspected the whole village before deciding that virtually everyone was long gone.


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